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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the world was shocked when thirteen-year-old Megan Meier 
committed suicide after being told that the world would be better off without her 
by a fake user on the social networking platform Myspace.1 This was neither the 
first nor the last suicide attributed to cyberbullying,2 and although suicide remains 
an infrequent outcome, its salience has called attention to the pervasiveness and 
gravity of technology-facilitated bullying among adolescents. Unfortunately, the law 
has failed to provide a satisfactory response. This Article aims to fill the gap, 
providing a law and economics analysis of the different models of civil liability for 
cyberbullying. It acknowledges three categories of potential defendants (see Figure 
1): (1) the juvenile wrongdoers, (2) real-life supervisors (parents, school personnel), 
and (3) virtual supervisors (such as social networking platforms). It systematically 
analyzes the legal rules delineating each party’s liability and evaluates the alternatives 
from an economic perspective. The Article demonstrates that technological 
innovation not only generates new risks or exacerbates old ones, but also simplifies 
the construction of efficient liability models to control them. In the context of 
juvenile bullying, imposing liability on real-life supervisors may be an inevitable 
solution to the fundamental inefficiencies of primary wrongdoers’ liability.3 Alas, 
supervisors’ liability in the digital age entails considerable information costs. 
Technology, which has transformed an old schoolyard problem into a cyberspace 
pandemic, now provides the tools to substantially reduce these costs. It facilitates 
the collection, analysis, and flow of information, thereby reducing the cost of 
preventive action. Liability rules can and should endorse these developments in an 
effort to secure efficient conduct of all parties involved. 
 
1. Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y. TIMES  
(Nov. 28, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html [https://perma.cc/ 
P7TL-BSAK]. 
2. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Felony Counts for 2 in Suicide of Bullied 12-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/us/felony-charges-for-2-girls-in-suicide-of-
bullied-12-year-old-rebecca-sedwick.html [https://perma.cc/G9LU-L8P6] (discussing Rebecca 
Sedwick’s suicide); see also Nicole P. Grant, Mean Girls and Boys: The Intersection of Cyberbullying and 
Privacy Law and Its Social-Political Implications, 56 HOW. L.J. 169, 185–88 (2012) (discussing suicide 
cases); Shira Auerbach, Note, Screening Out Cyberbullies: Remedies for Victims on the Internet Playground, 
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1641, 1641–42 (2009) (same); Emily Poole, Note, Hey Girls, Did You Know? 
Slut-Shaming on the Internet Needs to Stop, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 221, 236–39 (2013) (same); Tiffany Sumrall, 
Comment, Lethal Words: Harmful Impact of Cyberbullying and the Need for Federal Criminalization, 53 
HOUS. L. REV. 1475, 1480–81 (2016) (same). 
3. E.g., Benjamin Walther, Comment, Cyberbullying: Holding Grownups Liable for Negligent 
Entrustment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 531, 534 (2012) (presenting the negligent-entrustment theory of liability 
for cyberbullying cases). 
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Figure 1. Interaction and Information Flow 
 
Almost all adolescents in the United States currently have Internet access,4 
most have smartphones,5 and a majority of teenagers with web-access also have 
personal profiles on social networking platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, 
Tumblr, Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube.6 Regrettably, electronic devices and 
applications are increasingly used to transmit and disseminate harmful content, 
especially among teens. This harmful conduct can take various forms, from sending 
personal insults and threats, through the publication or sharing of embarrassing or 
humiliating texts, photographs, and videos, to organizing social boycotts and 
inciting real-life harassment.7 It may be carried out through text messaging, instant 
messaging, electronic mail, social networks, blog and forum posts, online comments 
and reviews, and the like.8 When such conduct is intentional, repeated, and involves 
a real or perceived power imbalance, it is generally referred to as “cyberbullying,”9 
although the term is rarely used in the context of adult cyber-harassment or  
cyber-stalking.10 Studies on both sides of the Atlantic show that one-third to fifty 
 
4. See Grant, supra note 2, at 178 (reporting 87% access rate in 2010); Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2008) (reporting 87% internet 
access rate in 2004); Poole, supra note 2, at 226 (reporting 95% general access rate and 75% mobile 
access rate in 2013). 
5. See Poole, supra note 2, at 226. 
6. Grant, supra note 2, at 178–79. 
7. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., What Is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/what-is-it/index.html [https://perma.cc/5YG3-
HDW5] ( last visited Feb. 15, 2020) (“Cyberbullying includes sending, posting, or sharing negative, 
harmful, false, or mean content about someone else. It can include sharing personal or private 
information about someone else causing embarrassment or humiliation.”). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. (defining “cyberbullying” as “bullying that takes place over digital devices”); U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., What Is Bullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV, https://www.stopbullying.gov/
what-is-bullying/index.html [https://perma.cc/T84D-7UDD] ( last visited Feb. 15, 2020) (defining 
“bullying” as “unwanted, aggressive behavior among school aged children that involves a real or 
perceived power imbalance” and is “repeated, or has the potential to be repeated, over time”); see also 
Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMS and E-Mails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine Be 
Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 16–19 (2010) 
(defining cyberbullying); Kathleen Conn, Best Practices in Bullying Prevention: One Size Does Not Fit 
All, 22 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 393, 393, 402 (2013) (same); Grant, supra note 2, at 183 (same); Peter 
K. Smith et al., Cyberbullying: Its Nature and Impact in Secondary School Pupils, 49 J. CHILD  
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 376, 376 (2008) (same); Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643 (same). 
10. Calvert, supra note 9, at 18–19. 
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percent of teens suffer from cyberbullying, many of them regularly.11 Not only are 
these practices more common among minors, but they are also more harmful to 
minors who are in greater need of social acceptance.12 
Cyberbullying may cause annoyance, anxiety, fright, embarrassment, 
humiliation, lowered self-esteem, and distress, and may even lead to social disorders, 
psychological disorders, and occasionally suicide attempts.13 A recent medical 
review article concluded that juvenile victims of cyberbullying are twice as likely as 
non-victims to cause self-harm and exhibit suicidal ideation and behavior.14 
Cyberbullying may be more severe than traditional bullying, because (1) it can be 
carried out effortlessly and instantly;15 (2) it has a much wider potential reach, 
increasing expected impact;16 (3) it can transcend the temporal and spatial 
boundaries of school activity;17 (4) the harmful speech may be harsher, because 
perpetrators behind a screen are not restrained by victims’ facial and bodily 
expressions of harm and bystanders’ expressions of indignation;18 (5) technology 
facilitates anonymity, which encourages unconstrained speech by shielding 
perpetrators from embarrassment, reprimand, and retaliation;19 (6) offensive speech 
cannot be easily removed, particularly when disseminated through various media;20 
and (7) juvenile online speech cannot be easily overseen by adults.21 Apart from its 
effects on victims, juvenile cyberbullying has negative effects on perpetrators, who 
 
11. E.g., A THIN LINE, 2009 AP-MTV DIGITAL ABUSE STUDY 1–2 (n.d.), http://
www.athinline.org/MTV-AP_Digital_Abuse_Study_Executive_Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7SFN-V7ZU] ( last visited Feb. 15, 2020 ) (reporting 50% victimization rate in the US); DITCH THE 
LABEL, THE ANNUAL BULLYING SURVEY 2017, at 15 (5th ed. 2017), https://www.ditchthelabel.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/07/The-Annual-Bullying-Survey-2017-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q9S-
WVM3] ( last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (reporting that 33% of UK teens experience cyberbullying often to 
constantly); Grant, supra note 2, at 178, 184 (reporting near 42%); Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643 
(reporting 75%); Amanda Lenhart, Cyberbullying, PEW RES. CTR. ( June 27, 2007), http://
www.pewinternet.org/2007/06/27/cyberbullying [https://perma.cc/5DCA-YTSD] (reporting 32%). 
12. Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online 
Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 851–52 (2010). 
13. See Conn, supra note 9, at 396–97; Duffy B. Trager, New Tricks for Old Dogs: The Tinker 
Standard Applied to Cyber-Bullying, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 553, 556 (2009); King, supra note 12, at 850–51. 
14. Ann John et al., Self-Harm, Suicidal Behaviours, and Cyberbullying in Children and Young 
People: Systematic Review, 20 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 129 passim (2018); see also Sameer Hinduja  
& Justin W. Patchin, Bullying, Cyberbullying, and Suicide, 14 ARCHIVES SUICIDE RES. 206, 206 (2010) 
(finding a link between suicidal ideation and cyberbullying). 
15. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643; Poole, supra note 2, at 243–44. 
16. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643; Poole, supra note 2, at 243–44. 
17. Calvert, supra note 9, at 14–16, 20; Poole, supra note 2, at 244–45; Sumrall, supra note 2, at 
1479; Walther, supra note 3, at 534. 
18. Calvert, supra note 9, at 20; Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1644; Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1479. 
19. Calvert, supra note 9, at 20; Grant, supra note 2, at 173–74, 198–99; Auerbach, supra note 2, 
at 1643–45; King, supra note 12, at 852; Poole, supra note 2, at 243, 259; Sumrall, supra note 2, at  
1479–80. 
20. Poole, supra note 2, at 244. 
21. Id. 
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are more prone to criminal activity and antisocial behavior,22 and on bystanders, 
who are exposed to greater mental risks.23 
The most common legal response to cyberbullying is delegating the 
responsibility to school boards.24 All state legislatures in the United States require 
school districts to prescribe and enforce anti-bullying policies,25 and many explicitly 
apply these rules to cyberbullying.26 While similar in principle, state statutes differ 
in various respects, including the definition of bullying and the degree of 
 
22. Conn, supra note 9, at 397–99; Susan M. Swearer & Shelley Hymel, Understanding the 
Psychology of Bullying: Moving Toward a Social-Ecological Diathesis–Stress Model, 70  
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 344, 347 (2015) (presenting impact on perpetrators). 
23. Conn, supra note 9, at 399–402. 
24. Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A 
Model Cyberbullying Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment 
Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641 (2011); Walther, supra note 3, at 539. 
25. See ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to 16-28B-9 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.200 (2006);  
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(36) (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(d)–(f) (2019);  
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.4 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT.  
§ 10-222d(b)–(c) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4164(a)–(b) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(2), (4) 
(2019); GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-751.4(b) (2016); HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-6 (LexisNexis 2009); IDAHO 
CODE § 33-1631 (2019); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 27-23.7 (2017); IND. CODE § 20-33-8-13.5(a) (2018); 
IOWA CODE § 280.28(3) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6147(b)–(c) (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
158.148(5) (West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(A)–(B) (2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 
1001(15) (2019); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1(b)(1)–(2) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, 
§ 37O(b), (d)(1)–(2) (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1310b(1) (2017); MINN. STAT.  
§ 121A.031 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-67(2) (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775(1) (2016); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-209 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2,137(3) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT.  
§ 388.133 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4(II) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(a), (b) 
(West 2012); N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.6 (2019); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 13 (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 115C-407.15(b), (d) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-18 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 3313.666(B) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.4(A) (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(1) 
(2012); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303.1-A(a) (2008); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-34 (2011) (imposing 
the duty on the state department of education); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-140(A), (B) (2006); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-14 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4503(a) (2019); TEX. EDUC. CODE 
ANN. § 37.001(a)(7) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-9-605(1)–(3) (LexisNexis 2019); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 16, § 165(a)(8) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-279.6(D), 22.1-291.4(A) (2019); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 28A.600.477(1)(a) (2018); W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-3(a)–(b) (2011); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2019); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-314(a) (2009). 
26. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(b)(2) (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d(a)(2) (2018); 
FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(3)(a) (2019); GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-751.4(a) (2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 
/ 27-23.7(b) (2017); IOWA CODE § 280.28(2)(b) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6147(a)(2) (2013);  
LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(C)(1)(b) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O(a) (2014); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 380.1310b(10)(b)–(c) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 121A.031(a)(2)–(3) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
37-11-67(1) (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775(2) (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-208(1) (2015); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2,137(2) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.133(1) (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 
193-F:4(II) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15.1(b) (West 2012); N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.7(a)–(b) 
(2019); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11(7)–(8) (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.15(a) (2009); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666(A)(2)(a) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.4(A)(1) (2016); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(2)(a) (2012); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303.1-A(e) (2008); 16 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 16-21-33(a)(1) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4503(a) (2019); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53G-9-
605(3)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11(a)(32) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
279.6(A) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.477(5)(b)(ii) (2018). 
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particularity.27 A less frequent legal response, which raises serious freedom of 
speech concerns,28 is criminalization of the harmful conduct. Legislators and 
scholars advocated federal criminalization of cyberbullying following Megan Meier’s 
suicide, but these attempts ultimately failed.29 A few state legislatures have already 
criminalized cyberbullying,30 but these criminal statutes typically apply to extreme 
subsets of this phenomenon, such as cyberstalking.31 Cases involving threats of 
violence may also be covered by specific federal legislation.32 In theory, 
cyberbullying resulting in suicide may be considered homicide,33 although causation 
may be difficult to establish.34 
A third possible response—namely civil liability—is rarely considered, hence 
undertheorized. There have been few civil lawsuits for real-life bullying,35 and even 
less reported attempts to sue for cyberbullying.36 In Finkel v. Dauber,37 members of 
 
27. Conn, supra note 9, at 419–24 (discussing state anti-bullying legislation); Mathew Fenn, 
Note, A Web of Liability: Does New Cyberbullying Legislation Put Public Schools in Sticky Situation?, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2729, 2754–55 (2013) (same). 
28. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 822 (N.C. 2016) (finding the criminalization of 
online publication of “private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor” unconstitutional); 
People v. Dietze, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (N.Y. 1989) (holding a criminal proscription of abusive speech 
with intent to harass unconstitutional hence invalid). 
29. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009), https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1966ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr1966ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K85N-QWLH] (imposing criminal penalties on “whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce 
any communication, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress 
to a person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior”). For more 
information about this bill, see Grant, supra note 2, at 201; Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1477, 1499–1500; 
and Walther, supra note 3, at 534, 536–37. 
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8(b) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(4)(h)(i) (2019); IDAHO 
CODE § 18-917A(2) (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.7 (2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 
2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2012), invalidated in part by State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 822 
(N.C. 2016). 
31. Walther, supra note 3, at 537. 
32. Federal law penalizes threats to injure transmitted over interstate lines, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) 
(2018), and electronic stalking which places the victim in a fear of serious injury or death or causes 
substantial emotional distress, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018). 
33. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 570 (Mass. 2019) (“[A] person might be 
charged with involuntary manslaughter for reckless or wanton conduct, including verbal conduct, 
causing a victim to commit suicide.”); Audrey Rogers, Death by Bullying: A Comparative Culpability 
Proposal, 35 PACE L. REV. 343, 365 (2014) (“For egregious bullying cases, prosecutors can and should 
consider possible homicide charges.”). 
34. See Nicholas LaPalme, Note, Michelle Carter and the Curious Case of Causation: How to 
Respond to a Newly Emerging Class of Suicide-Related Proceedings, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1443, 1446–53 (2018) 
(discussing the causation hurdle in prosecuting encouragement of suicide). 
35. Tracy Tefertiller, Out of the Principal’s Office and Into the Courtroom: How Should California 
Approach Criminal Remedies for School Bullying?, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 168, 189 (2011); see, e.g., Doe 
v. Bristol Bd. of Educ., No. CV065002257, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3508 (Mar. 23, 2007); Jasperson 
v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. A06-1904, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1071 
(Oct. 30, 2007).
36. See D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, rev. denied, No. S181558, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 6052 ( June 
17, 2010); Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Draker v. Schreiber, 271  
S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App. 2008). 
37. Finkel, 906 N.Y.S.2d. 697. 
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a Facebook group run by New York adolescents posted defamatory statements 
about their school peer, claiming that she contracted HIV by having sex with an 
animal or a male prostitute, or by sharing a needle with a heroin addict, and 
consequently “morfed [sic] into the devil.”38 The claim was dismissed.39 In  
D.C. v. R.R.,40 a Los Angeles high school student was the subject of posts by fellow 
students on his own website “making derogatory comments about his perceived 
sexual orientation and threatening him with bodily harm.”41 The student sued, but 
the only legal issue decided by the court was whether the California anti-SLAPP 
statute applied (a question answered in the negative).42 The scarcity of case law may 
explain why no serious attempt has been made to analyze and evaluate competing 
liability theories in the legal literature.43 This reality is perplexing in light of the 
general jurisprudential assumption that criminal liability, which is frequently 
considered as a response to juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, is a residual system, 
reserved for cases in which less stringent legal and extra-legal systems fail.44 
Part I systematically discusses the law pertaining to civil liability of the three 
categories of potential defendants. Section A begins with an overview of the various 
causes of action that can be employed in lawsuits against cyberbullies. It identifies 
the possible obstacles to primary wrongdoers’ liability on the legal, technological, 
and financial levels. Section B focuses on real-life supervisors. It first examines 
relevant theories of parental liability and their limits. Next, it analyzes common law 
and statutory bases of school district and school personnel liability and explains the 
constitutional constraints on school regulation of student conduct. Section C 
discusses virtual supervisors’ liability. It shows that bringing lawsuits against virtual 
supervisors for wrongful user-contributions is almost impossible under American 
law and presents alternative models. 
Part II evaluates the different liability regimes from an economic perspective 
and constructs an efficient technologically-assisted model. Section A explains that 
primary wrongdoers’ liability cannot achieve efficient deterrence because of minors’ 
(1) inability to compensate their victims, (2) limited cognitive, emotional, and social 
capacity, and (3) frequent use of anonymity. Section B evaluates real-life supervisors’ 
liability, focusing on the gap between the ability to affect juvenile conduct and the 
high cost of information about misconduct. Section C shows that virtual 
 
38. Id. at 700. 
39. Id. at 702. In Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 318, a claim for cyberbullying was similarly denied, but 
the victim was not a minor, so the case does not squarely fall within the ambit of this article. 
40. D.C., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404–05. 
41. Id. at 1199. 
42. Id. The acronym SLAPP stands for strategic lawsuit against public participation. 
43. Noteworthy exceptions are Bradley A. Areheart, Regulating Cyberbullies Through  
Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 41 (2007), and Walther, supra note 3, but each 
focuses on a different defendant and neither provides comprehensive legal and economic analyses. 
44. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL  
STUD. 207 passim (2004) (discussing the principle of criminalization as a last resort); Nils Jareborg, 
Criminalization as Last Resort, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 525 (2005) (same). 
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supervisors’ liability may be inefficient due to the high cost of monitoring,  
non-internalization of the vast economic benefits of Web 2.0 services by service 
providers, and an asymmetry between false negative and false positive 
determinations of wrongfulness. More importantly, it argues that virtual supervisors 
may have some access to relevant information but lack the power to affect juvenile 
conduct. Finally, Section D constructs an efficient liability model based on parental 
supervision and technologically-facilitated reduction in information costs. 
I. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. The Wrongdoer 
1. Causes of Action 
The obvious candidate for liability in a case of cyber-wrongdoing is the 
primary wrongdoer. The first analytical step, therefore, is to identify possible causes 
of action for such wrongdoing. When cyber-wrongdoing leads to actual violence, 
or consists of threats thereof, an action for battery or assault may ensue.45 This, 
however, is uncommon; cyberbullying is mostly a speech-based phenomenon and 
should be addressed accordingly.46 No jurisdiction in the United States has hitherto 
recognized a specific cause of action for cyberbullying.47 In Finkel v. Dauber, for 
example, the court made clear that New York law does not “recognize cyberbullying 
or Internet bullying as a cognizable tort action.”48 Of course, this does not preclude 
future development of such a tort. Indeed, the legislature of the Canadian province 
of Nova Scotia explicitly recognized a specific tort of cyberbullying,49 and some 
scholars advocated a similar development in the United States.50 However, until this 
happens, victims must rely on other causes of action.51 
 
45. If a person “acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the 
other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact” then he is liable for battery if 
a harmful contact results, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965), and for 
assault if the other is only “put in such imminent apprehension.” Id. § 21. 
46. See Walther, supra note 3, at 542 (“Unlike the traditional bully who could be sued for assault 
and battery, the cyberbully only engages in hurtful speech over the Internet.”). 
47. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697, 703 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Walther, supra note 3, at 542. 
48. Finkel, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
49. The first legislative recognition of a specific tort was in the Cyber-Safety Act, S.N.S. 2013, 
c 2, § 21 (Can.). This Act was struck down for infringing the constitutional freedom of expression and 
right to liberty. Crouch v. Snell, 2015 NSSC 340, paras. 106, 116, 137, 158, 166, 175, 184, 187, 191, 203, 
207, 221 (Can. N.S.). In 2017, the Nova Scotia legislature enacted a more limited liability rule. Intimate 
Images and Cyber-Protection Act, S.N.S. 2017, c 7, § 6(3) (Can.).
50. See, e.g., Jonathan Heller, Note, The Chat Room Moderator: Creating a Duty for Parents to 
Control Their Cyberbully, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 165, 172 (2015) (addressing criticism of the Nova  
Scotia statute). 
51. This Section discusses common law causes of action. There may be state-specific statutory 
causes of action. For example, in California, any person has the right to be free from “intimidation by 
threat of violence” motivated by the victim’s actual or perceived disability, gender, race, religion or 
sexual orientation. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7(a) (West 2019). 
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If a child or an adolescent publishes disparaging statements about another 
through electronic devices and applications, an action for defamation may be 
appropriate. Defamation is defined as a communication that tends to “harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to 
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”52 To successfully bring a 
defamation claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant’s statement about 
the plaintiff was both false and defamatory, (2) the statement was published without 
privilege to a third party, (3) the defendant’s conduct involved fault (at least 
negligence), and (4) the statement is actionable per se or its publication caused 
special harm.53 
The main obstacle here is that an action for defamation is based on a statement 
of fact, not an opinion.54 Generally, opinions enjoy First Amendment protection.55 
The Supreme Court highlighted this distinction in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,56 
holding that a statement is one of fact, rather than mere opinion, if it is “provable 
as false” and can be “reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts.”57 Thus, 
imaginative expressions, rhetorical hyperboles, and conjectures, which a reasonable 
audience cannot perceive as statements of fact, are not actionable.58 In Finkel  
v. Dauber,59 mentioned in the Introduction, members of a teenage Facebook group 
posted defamatory statements about their peer, claiming that she contracted HIV 
through contemptible conduct and “morfed [sic] into the devil.”60 The court held 
that group members could not be liable for defamation, because the posts could 
only be read as puerile attempts by adolescents to outdo each other, not as 
statements of fact.61 Similarly, in Draker v. Schreiber,62 teenage students created a 
Myspace profile under their vice-principal’s name, which contained her personal 
information and explicit and graphic sexual references. The vice-principal sued, and 
the trial court granted the students’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the 
cause of action for defamation.63 It agreed that the “exaggerated and derogatory 
statements” included in the fake profile were not assertions of fact that could be 
objectively verified and therefore could not be defamatory.64 
 
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
53. Id. § 558. 
54. Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1496; Walther, supra note 3, at 544. 
55. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1667. 
56. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
57. Id. at 19–20. 
58. Id.; see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g 
Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970); Catherine J. Ross, Incredible Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 
400–17 (2018) (discussing incredible lies in defamation law). 
59. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
60. Id. at 700. 
61. Id. at 702. 
62. Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App. 2008). 
63. Id. at 321. 
64. Id. 
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Another obstacle is that even defamatory statements of fact cannot be 
actionable unless they are false. Truth has always been an absolute defense against 
a lawsuit for defamation.65 Statements made by adolescents to harass their peers are 
sometimes true, as in the unfortunate yet common event of bullying based on sexual 
orientation.66 Additionally, when the harassment takes the form of private 
communication between the wrongdoer and the victim, such as a personal text 
message or an e-mail, the requirement of publication is not satisfied.67 Finally, 
teenage victims may be unable to establish special harm.68 
In many cases, cyberbullying involves public disclosure of private matters, 
which is one of the recognized categories of the tort of invasion of privacy. Liability 
can arise if the defendant (1) gave publicity to a matter concerning the private life 
of the plaintiff, (2) the matter publicized would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and (3) the matter is not of legitimate concern to the public.69 This tort 
encompasses true factual statements, which the tort of defamation does not cover. 
A notable example is the Tyler Clementi incident, in which a student committed 
suicide after his roommate secretly streamed his sexual encounter with another 
man.70 Liability can arise only if the publication would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, and this requirement precludes recovery in many instances of 
cyber-invasion of privacy.71 Another recognized category of invasion of privacy, 
which may apply to some cases of cyber-harassment, is intrusion “upon the solitude 
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns.”72 It may occur in the 
digital rather than the physical world,73 and does not require publication of any sort. 
Intrusion upon seclusion gives rise to liability if it is intentional and “highly offensive 
to a reasonable person.”74 
A third possible cause of action is intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(hereinafter IIED). The tort requires proof of four elements: (1) extreme or 
outrageous conduct, (2) intention or recklessness, (3) severe emotional harm, and 
(4) a causal link between the conduct and the harm.75 As per the first requirement, 
 
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
66. Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1496. 
67. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1650, 1667. 
68. Walther, supra note 3, at 545–46. 
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D. 
70. Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html [https://perma.cc/ 
M5GL-6LW8]. 
71. Walther, supra note 3, at 545 n.90. 
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.  
73. See, e.g., Roberts v. CareFlite, No. 02-12-00105-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 8371 (Oct. 4, 
2012) (suing her employer for an invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion after she was 
terminated for “unprofessional and insubordinate” Facebook activity—a comment on a  
friend’s post). 
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B; see also Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853  
S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993) (endorsing § 652B). 
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM  
§ 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also 
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liability can be imposed only if the conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”76 While 
cyberbullying may be harmful, it does not ordinarily reach this bar. The  
severity-of-harm requirement may also be an insurmountable obstacle,77 especially 
in the few jurisdictions that require physical harm.78 Furthermore, in some 
jurisdictions, IIED is considered a “gap-filler” tort, created to permit recovery in 
“those rare instances in which a defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional 
distress in a manner so unusual that the victim has no other recognized theory of 
redress.”79 If the gravamen of the claim is a wrong that another cause of action was 
meant to cover, IIED cannot be employed, whether or not the plaintiff succeeds 
on or even relies on the other cause of action.80 Thus, in Draker  
v. Schreiber,81 the court held that since the gravamen of the complaint was 
defamation, IIED was inapplicable, even though the defamation action failed.82 To 
maintain a claim for IIED, the plaintiff had to allege facts independent of her 
defamation claim.83 
A related cause of action is negligent infliction of emotional distress 
(hereinafter NIED). In most jurisdictions, a plaintiff relying on this theory must 
establish serious emotional harm, and prove that the defendant placed him or her 
in danger of immediate bodily harm and that the emotional harm resulted from the 
physical danger.84 The severity-of-harm threshold may hinder liability for NIED in 
many cases of cyber-harassment, as it does with respect to IIED.85 Additionally, the 
requirement of immediate physical danger, known as the “zone of danger” test, will 
preclude liability for NIED in most instances of cyberbullying, because potentially 
harmful speech in cyberspace does not typically involve physical danger. The  
zone-of-danger requirement may be satisfied in cases of cyber-incitement to 
violence which generates physical risk in the real world and in the relatively rare 
cases of pushing victims to commit suicide or self-harm.
 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 740–41 (Tex. 2003); Morgan v. Anthony, 27 S.W.3d 
928, 929 (Tex. 2000). 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d; see also Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 
N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993) (“[O]f the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims considered 
by this Court, every one has failed because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous.”). 
77. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1670–71. 
78. See, e.g., Engel v. Buchan, 791 F. Supp. 2d 604, 609 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that Missouri 
law requires a plaintiff to prove bodily harm to recover for IIED). 
79. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004). 
80. Id. at 448. 
81. Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. App. 2008). 
82. Id. at 323. 
83. Id. at 323–24. 
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM  
§ 47 & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
85. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1670–71. 
First to Printer_Perry.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/20  9:49 AM 
1230 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1219 
Lastly, the prima facie tort, which the Supreme Court first recognized in 
Aikens v. Wisconsin,86 is defined as infliction of intentional harm, resulting in 
damages, without excuse or justification.87 Under the New York version, also 
endorsed in other jurisdictions,88 the tort applies only if the defendant’s conduct 
“would otherwise be lawful.”89 Thus, this cause of action is not available if the 
defendant’s acts fall within one of the traditional tort categories.90 Under section 
870 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “liability may be imposed although the 
actor’s conduct does not come within a traditional category of tort liability.”91 In 
other words, the tort may apply even if the conduct falls within an existing category 
of tort.92 Either way, the prima facie tort is in effect a residual principle of  
intention-based liability, because the defendant’s conduct should or may be 
“otherwise lawful.”93 The defendant’s intent to cause harm makes the otherwise 
lawful act actionable; so the doctrine seems to punish bad motives, not wrongful 
conduct.94 This feature has spawned criticism95 and led to the rejection of the 
doctrine in many jurisdictions.96 
According to a narrow but common interpretation of the intent element, there 
can be no recovery in prima facie tort, unless malevolence is the sole motive for 
defendant’s otherwise lawful act or, in Justice Holmes’s words, unless the defendant 
acts from “disinterested malevolence.”97 Put differently, the defendant does not aim 
 
86. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) (“[P]rima facie, the intentional infliction of 
temporal damages is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form 
of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape.”) (italics added). 
87. ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (N.Y. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“One who intentionally causes injury to another is 
subject to liability . . . if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances.”). 
88. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of 
Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 450, 494–95 (1990). 
89. ATI, 368 N.E.2d at 1232; see also Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 
N.E.2d 459, 467 (N.Y. 1983); Geri Shapiro, Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine: Acknowledging the 
Need for Judicial Scrutiny of Malice, 63 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (1983) (discussing ATI and  
other cases). 
90. Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1104; Vandevelde, supra note 88, at 450, 491–92. 
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870.  
92. Vandevelde, supra note 88, at 450, 494. 
93. Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1104. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1104, 1107 (“This implication has evoked much criticism from courts that believe the 
law should punish only wrongful acts, and not wrongful thoughts . . . . The most frequent criticism of 
the prima facie tort doctrine is that courts should not make bad motives actionable.”). 
96. See, e.g., Krause v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 49 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Mich. 1951) (“Bad 
motive, by itself . . . is no tort. Malicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make that a 
wrong which in its own essence is lawful. An act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be 
actionable because it is done with a bad intent.”); Teas v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 460 S.W.2d 
233, 242 (Tex. App. 1970) (“If an act be lawful . . . an improper motive does not render it unlawful . . . . 
Malicious motives make a bad case worse, but it cannot make that wrong which, in its own essence, is 
lawful.”); Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1107–08. 
97. Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.Y. 1983) 
(quoting Am. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921)); see also Shapiro, 
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to promote any personal interests by his or her conduct, except venting his or her 
ill will.98 The Second Restatement of Torts adopted a less rigid approach: “If the 
only motive of the actor is a desire to harm the plaintiff, this fact becomes a very 
important factor”99—very important rather than decisive. These interpretations are 
sometimes criticized as making the “lack of excuse or justification” element 
redundant. If a justification exists, malevolence cannot be the sole motivation; so if 
the defendant also intended to promote a certain interest, the analysis stops at the 
intent element, and the justification element will not be examined.100 An alternative 
interpretation of the intent element requires that malevolence be the primary or 
dominant motivation.101 Another possible interpretation requires malevolence but 
not as the sole or dominant motivation. According to this approach, after 
establishing malice, the court must determine whether the malicious conduct may 
be excused or justified.102 Cyberbullying will often satisfy the malevolence 
requirement, even under the narrow interpretation, and definitely under the more 
flexible approaches. 
2. Legal Barriers 
In many civil law and mixed jurisdictions, children under a certain age are 
exempt from liability. For example, the minimum age of liability is seven in 
Germany103 and Portugal,104 twelve in Israel,105 and fourteen in Austria,106 the 
Netherlands,107 and Russia.108 Age-based immunity might thwart many lawsuits of 
juvenile cyberbullying victims. By contrast, and with very few exceptions,109  
Anglo-American law does not normally set a minimum age for liability.110 Rather, it 
imposes more lenient constraints on juvenile liability. 
 
supra note 89, at 1117–18 (discussing the “disinterested malevolence” requirement); Vandevelde, supra 
note 88, at 491 (same). 
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
99. Id. 
100. Shapiro, supra note 89, at 1118–19. 
101. Id. at 1123–25. 
102. Id. at 1120–22. 
103. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 828, para. 1 (Ger.). The minimum 
age for liability is ten years in cases of traffic accidents. 
104. Código Civil [Civil Code] § 488(2) (Port.). 
105. Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 5733-1972 § 9(a), 4, (Isr.). 
106. ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 153 (Austria). 
107. Art. 6:164 BW (Neth.). 
108. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code]  
art. 26(2) (Russ.). 
109. Georgia seems to be the exception, recognizing immunity from liability to minors under 
the age of thirteen. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-6 (West 2018) (“Infancy is no defense to a tort action so 
long as the defendant has reached the age of discretion and accountability prescribed by Code Section 
16-3-1 for criminal offenses.”). 
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895I (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“One who is an infant 
is not immune from tort liability solely for that reason.”); Donald Paul Duffala, Annotation, Modern 
Trends as to Tort Liability of Child of Tender Age, 27 A.L.R.4th 15, §§ 2[a], 3[a] (2019). 
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First, in some common law jurisdictions, children under a certain age, usually 
seven or five, are conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence because they 
cannot recognize and appreciate risks.111 In some jurisdictions, children under the 
same age cannot be held liable for intentional torts as well because of their limited 
cognitive and moral capacity.112 Arguably, intent with respect to outcomes, as 
opposed to intent with respect to the conduct, should be treated like foreseeability 
of harm in negligence.113 Currently, children under the age of seven are unlikely to 
take part in cyberbullying, but if this occurs, they cannot be liable for intentional 
torts or negligence in these jurisdictions. 
Second, some jurisdictions recognize a rebuttable presumption, whereby 
children within a specific age range cannot be negligent. For example, in Alabama, 
Illinois, Kentucky, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, a child between 
the ages of seven and fourteen is rebuttably presumed to be incapable of 
negligence.114 In New Jersey, a rebuttable presumption applies to children of less 
than seven years of age.115 Although rebuttable presumptions are not as detrimental 
to a victim’s case as conclusive presumptions, they surely generate an  
evidentiary impediment. 
Third, age is relevant in determining whether a child could form the mental 
attitudes which underlie the tort. In an action for negligence, if the actor is a child, 
the standard of conduct to which he or she must conform to avoid being negligent 
is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like 
circumstances.116 In an action for an intentional tort, the age of the child is relevant 
 
111. See, e.g., Willoughby v. Stilz, 387 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Ky. 1965) (“[A] child under seven years of 
age is considered incapable of negligence.”); Faia v. Landry, 249 So. 2d 317, 319 (La. App. 1971) (same); 
Queen Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 132 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1965) (same); Burns v. Eminger, 261 P. 613, 
615 (Mont. 1927) (same); Walston v. Greene, 102 S.E.2d 124, 125 (N.C. 1958) (same); DeLuca  
v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111–12 (Ohio 1975) (same); Dodd v. Spartanburg Ry. Gas  
& Elec. Co., 78 S.E. 525, 528 (S.C. 1913) (same); Von Saxe v. Barnett, 217 P. 62, 63 (Wash. 1902) 
(same); cf. Nielsen v. Bell, 370 P.3d 925, 929 (Utah 2016) (adopting a conclusive presumption for 
children under the age of five); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 10(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (same). 
112. See, e.g., Carey v. Reeve, 781 P.2d 904, 907 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (children under six 
years of age cannot form an intent to harm others).
113. See Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 698 N.E.2d 271, 278 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (explaining 
that children may be liable for intentional torts where the only intent required is an intent to perform 
the act, as in the case of battery, whereas children under the age of seven are not liable in negligence 
because they cannot foresee the consequences of their actions); Shiflet v. Segovia, 318 N.E.2d 876, 879 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (same). 
114. Patrick v. Mitchell, 6 So. 2d 889, 890 (Ala. 1942); Appelhans v. McFall, 757 N.E.2d 987, 
992 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Willoughby, 387 S.W.2d at 11; Walston, 102 S.E.2d at 125; Kuhns v. Brugger, 
390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395, 401 (Pa. 1957); Prater v. Burns, 525 S.W.2d 846, 852  
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1975). 
115. Bush v. N.J. & N.Y. Transit Co., 153 A.2d 28, 33 (N.J. 1959). 
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also McGregor  
v. Marini, 256 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 783 
N.W.2d 806, 813 (N.D. 2010); Kuhns, 135 A.2d at 401; Standard v. Shine, 295 S.E.2d 786, 787  
(S.C. 1982); Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533, 
558 n.123 (2013). This rule also applies in Australia and in England. McHale v. Watson (1966) 115 CLR 
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in determining whether the child knew with substantial certainty that his or her 
intentional act would cause a harmful or offensive contact.117 Courts may conclude 
that the specific defendant was unable to form the necessary intent.118 In 
jurisdictions with tender-years presumptions of no fault, these adjustments are made 
beyond the age covered by the presumptions,119 and in all other jurisdictions they 
apply to all minors. 
All three constraints pertain to fault-based liability, so children may be liable 
like adults under strict liability regimes.120 Strict liability usually applies to especially 
dangerous activities, such as driving or product manufacturing, or to the ownership 
of dangerous things, such as dogs or weapons; thus, while a child may sometimes 
be the “keeper” of an animal or the manufacturer of a product, harmful activity 
subject to strict liability is less likely to involve juvenile perpetrators.121 More 
importantly, all causes of action applicable to cyberbullying are fault-based. 
3. Technological Barriers 
A victim of juvenile cyber-wrongdoing seeking to sue the perpetrator might 
face a technological barrier because technology enables wrongdoers to mask their 
true identities.122 A lawsuit against an anonymous tortfeasor requires a procedural 
tool to unmask his or her identity. To enable plaintiffs to do so, the law must first 
devise a process for ordering the relevant platform operator to turn over the 
wrongdoer’s identifying information, usually an Internet Protocol (IP) address. 
Then, the plaintiff must identify the Internet Service Provider (ISP) linked to the 
relevant IP address (using the WHOIS directory), and request contact information 
of the user associated with this IP address.123 Sometimes, the IP address will point 
to a public or a multiuser computer, and the plaintiff will need to turn to the 
 
199, 210 (Austl.); Ken Oliphant, Children as Tortfeasors Under the Law of England and Wales, in 
CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 147, 154–55 (Miquel Martín-Casals 
ed., 2006). 
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895I cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“The 
immaturity of the infant is, however, to be taken into consideration in determining, in the first instance, 
whether the tort has been committed at all. In intentional torts, the state of mind of the actor is an 
essential element . . . . A child may be of such tender years that he has no awareness of these matters 
and is in fact incapable of the specific intent that is required.”); see also Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 
1094 (Wash. 1955). 
118. E.g., Seaburg v. Williams, 161 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959) (“Based upon the 
evidence of defendant’s age, capacity, intelligence and experience, we conclude that he lacked the mental 
and moral capacity to possess the intent to do the act complained of.”). 
119. See, e.g., Appelhans, 757 N.E.2d at 992; Kuhns, 135 A.2d at 401. 
120. See Miquel Martín-Casals, Comparative Report, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART  
I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 423, 434 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (concluding that in most 
legal systems children are subject to strict liability like adults). 
121. Oliphant, supra note 116, at 157–58. 
122. Areheart, supra note 43, at 41–42. 
123. Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE 
L.J. 320, 328 (2008). ISPs usually obtain and retain such information for their ongoing operations, such 
as billing. 
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operator of this computer system (a library, a workplace, a café, etc.) to obtain 
information about the wrongdoer.124 Some legal systems are reluctant to provide 
plaintiffs with unmasking abilities.125 Even in legal systems that enable  
de-anonymization, tortfeasors may evade liability by using advanced anonymization 
tools, such as Tor,126 by connecting through public hotspots which do not require 
registration or by chance when the relevant records are lost along the way. 
American courts can order online platform operators to disclose information 
about anonymous wrongdoers. True, the right to anonymity is well established 
under American law, and in some instances—especially when pertaining to speech 
and assembly—it receives constitutional protection.127 But when there is sufficient 
evidence to establish a cause of action against an anonymous user, courts enable the 
victim to apply for a John Doe subpoena, ordering a third party—here a platform 
operator or an Internet Service Provider—to divulge information it possesses about 
that user.128 Some controversy exists about the standard of evidence for establishing 
the plaintiff’s claim, which must be met prior to issuing such an order,129 but this 
procedural tool’s availability is undisputed. 
4. Financial Barriers
Lawsuits against juvenile cyber-wrongdoers might be hindered by two kinds 
of financial difficulties—one relating to the victim and the other to the wrongdoer. 
First, civil litigation is costly. The plaintiff incurs court charges, attorneys’ fees, 
witnesses’ and experts’ expenditures and remuneration, opportunity costs, and 
intangible harms.130 These costs impact the tendency to sue, depending also on the 
probability of success and the claim-value,131 and on the plaintiff’s economic and 
 
124. Id. (discussing the two-step process). 
125. In Israel, for example, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a procedural tool for 
requesting disclosure of anonymous users’ information. CA 4447/07 Mor v. Barak ITC–Int’l Telecom. 
Corp. 63(3) PD 664, 717 (2010) (Isr.). 
126. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14  
S. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 234 (2006) (explaining that sophisticated wrongdoers can “conceal their tracks 
by routing messages through a convoluted path that is difficult for authorities to uncover”). In the 
related context of online anonymous copyright infringement, a federal district court explicitly admitted 
that “the technology that enables [wrongdoing] has outpaced technology that prevents it.” Hard Drive 
Prods., Inc. v. Doe 1-90, No. C11-03825 HRL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45509, at *23  
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012). 
127. A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and the Law in the United States, in LESSONS FROM THE 
IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 441, 442 (Ian 
Kerr et al. eds., 2009). 
128. See Gleicher, supra note 123, at 325 (examining the efficacy of John Doe subpoenas). 
129. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 600 (4th  
ed. 2011) (discussing the different standards); Gleicher, supra note 123, at 325, 337, 340–50 (same); see, 
e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096–97 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (quashing a 
subpoena request for identification of anonymous online users because the request failed to show that 
the information related to the core claim). 
130. Ronen Perry, Crowdfunding Civil Justice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1357, 1361 (2018). 
131. Louis T. Visscher & Tom Schepens, A Law and Economics Approach to Cost Shifting, Fee 
Arrangements and Legal Expense Insurance, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
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psychological conditions. Litigation costs might inhibit access to justice when (1) 
they exceed the claimant’s expected benefit from litigation, (2) the victim does not 
have sufficient resources, or (3) the victim is unwilling to bear the costs due to  
risk-aversion and the uncertainties of the process.132 Various methods have been 
devised to assist meritorious claimants. For example, attorneys’ contingency fee 
arrangements, whereby lawyers’ remuneration is contingent on success and 
calculated as a percentage of plaintiffs’ recovery,133 third-party litigation funding,134 
and recently even crowdfunding.135 But these methods may prove inadequate where 
expected damages are limited and the costs of litigation—including the costs of 
tracking down anonymous culprits, litigating, and enforcing judgments—are 
substantial, as in many cases of cyberbullying.136 
Second, juvenile wrongdoers are usually judgment-proof defendants.137 Even 
if identified, sued, and held liable, they do not have the resources to adequately 
compensate their victims. Inability to pay damages might undermine the goals of 
civil liability, including corrective justice and deterrence.138 However, at this stage it 
is notable primarily because the existence of a cause of action is futile if the victim 
cannot recover damages thereunder. The two financial barriers are clearly  
related: if the tortfeasor is known to be judgment-proof, expected damages are 
lower; and if litigation costs exceed expected damages, the victim is very likely to 
give up the lawsuit in the first place. 
B. Real-Life Supervisors 
1. Parents 
Some of the difficulties associated with direct liability of juvenile  
cyber-wrongdoers may be overcome through secondary or indirect liability. The 
first category of potential defendants is wrongdoers’ parents. The common law does 
not impose vicarious liability upon parents qua parents for their children’s torts.139 
Thus, a parent may be vicariously liable only in one of two cases: (1) the child is his 
or her servant or agent, and the general common law principles of vicarious liability 
 
EUROPE 7, 14 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2005) (“[T]here is a critical probability of success and 
a critical value of the claim below which the plaintiff will not sue.”). 
132. Perry, supra note 130, at 1361. 
133. Id. at 1364. 
134. Id. at 1365–66. 
135. Id. at 1368–70. 
136. See Walther, supra note 3, at 546 (explaining that the relatively high litigation costs might 
deter cyberbullying victims from pursuing meritorious claims). 
137. See Areheart, supra note 43, at 42 (noting that most cyberbullies are judgment-proof); 
Walther, supra note 3, at 546 (same). 
138. See infra Section II.A. 
139. Kaminski v. Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048, 1051 (Conn. 1990); Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d 
766, 768–69 (Ga. 1971); Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Parents’ Liability for Injury or Damage 
Intentionally Inflicted by Minor Child, 54 A.L.R.3d 974, § 3 (2017). 
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apply;140 or (2) a statute imposes vicarious parental liability,141 either generally, as in 
Hawaii142 and Louisiana,143 or in limited contexts, such as malicious or willful 
causation of physical injury (with very low liability caps)144 or wrongful driving.145 
A parent may also be directly liable if he or she participates in the child’s wrongful 
conduct by directing or inducing it,146 consenting thereto,147 or ratifying it.148 
Generally, though, parents’ liability will hinge on their independent 
negligence.149 Three theories of liability may be of use. The first is negligent 
 
140. See, e.g., Teagarden v. McLaughlin, 86 Ind. 476, 477–78 (1882) (holding a father-employer 
liable for harm caused by son-employee); Altoonian v. Muldonian, 177 N.E. 830 (Mass. 1931) (same); 
see also Porter, supra note 116, at 557; Habeeb, supra note 139, §§ 4–5. 
141. See Michael A. Axel, Statutory Vicarious Parental Liability: Review and Reform, 32 CASE  
W. RES. L. REV. 559, 565–74 (1982) (discussing the history and nature of these statutes). 
142. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-3 (West 2019) (“The father and mother of unmarried minor 
children shall jointly and severally be liable . . . for tortious acts committed by their children . . . .”). 
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (2019) (“The father and the mother are responsible for the 
damage occasioned by their minor child . . . .”); Held v. Wilt, 610 So. 2d 1103, 1104  
(La. Ct. App. 1992). 
144. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 2019) (limiting the parent’s liability for any tort 
committed by the child to $25,000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (West 2019) (limiting liability 
to $5,000); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $10,000); KAN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 38-120 (2019) (limiting liability to $5,000, unless the parent was negligent); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.2913 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $2,500); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-801 (West 2019) 
(limiting liability to $1,000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.470 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $10,000); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-27 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $4,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 1-538.1 (West 2019) (limiting liability to $2,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.09–.10 (West 2019) 
(limiting liability to $10,000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-203 (2019) (limiting liability to $2,000; applies 
only to property damage); see also Hanks v. Booth, 726 P.2d 1319 (Kan. 1986) (applying the Kansas 
provision); Alber v. Nolle, 645 P.2d 456, 458 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (applying the New Mexico 
provision); Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rabideau, 395 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (applying the Ohio 
provision). 
145. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 28.15.071 (West 2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3160 
(2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-702 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-11 (West 2019). 
146. Porter, supra note 116, at 557; Habeeb, supra note 139, § 6. 
147. Habeeb, supra note 139, § 7. 
148. Id. § 8. 
149. This is also true in most civil law jurisdictions. In some, the victim must establish the 
parent’s fault. See, e.g., Bertil Bengtsson, Children as Tortfeasors Under Swedish Law, in CHILDREN IN 
TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 415, 417–18 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006); 
Susanna Hirsch, Children as Tortfeasors Under Austrian Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART  
I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 7, 40–41 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing ALLGEMEINES 
BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 1309 (Austria)). In others, a rebuttable 
presumption of fault exists. See, e.g., Giovanni Comandé & Luca Nocco, Children as Tortfeasors Under 
Italian Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 265, 278–79 (Miquel 
Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing Codice civile [C.c.] §§ 2047-48 (It.)); Pieter De Tavernier, Children 
as Tortfeasors Under Belgian Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 
63, 85–88 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing CODE CIVIL [C.CIV.] art. 1384(2), (5) (Belg.), 
whereby parents are liable for any damage caused by their minor children unless they can demonstrate 
they have not committed a wrongful conduct); Miquel Martín-Casals et al., Children as Tortfeasors Under 
Spanish Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 369, 387-90 (Miquel 
Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing Spanish law); Gerhard Wagner, Children as Tortfeasors Under 
German Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 217, 235–37 (Miquel 
Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 832 (Ger.)). 
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entrustment of a dangerous instrument. The Second Restatement of Torts offers a 
relatively broad interpretation of this principle. Section 390 provides that a person 
who supplies a chattel for the use of another, when he or she knows or has reason 
to know that the other is likely, because of young age, to use it in a way creating 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to that other or to third parties, is liable for 
ensuing physical harm.150 Put differently, a parent may be directly liable for the 
child’s wrongdoing if he or she was negligent in entrusting to the child an instrument 
which, because of its nature, use, and purpose, is so dangerous as to constitute, in 
the hands of the child, an unreasonable risk to others.151 Arguably, in the case of 
cyberbullying, liability can arise if a parent negligently entrusts a computer, a tablet, 
or a smartphone to a child, when the parent knows or should know that the child 
is likely to use the device to cyberbully his or her peers.152 
The element of entrustment does not raise a special problem in the current 
context. “Entrustment” encompasses giving an item, such as a personal computer 
or a smartphone, to the child as a present, allowing the child to temporarily borrow 
the item, and allowing the item to be in such a position that the child could use it 
even without permission.153 The element of actual or constructive knowledge is 
established if the person who receives the chattel belongs to a class which is 
notoriously incompetent to use it safely, lacks the individual training and experience 
necessary for safe use, previously acted in a way that makes a dangerous use of the 
chattel likely, or has a propensity or intent to misuse the chattel despite being able 
to use it safely.154 If a child has a past record of cyber-wrongdoing (or even physical 
bullying), a tendency to harass or an expressed intent to do so, the parent knows or 
has reason to know of the risk. On the other hand, the element of physical harm 
limits the applicability of the doctrine in cyberbullying cases, which usually do not 
culminate in personal injury or death. 
Moreover, although several jurisdictions follow the Restatement’s broad 
language,155 many do not, so an action for negligent entrustment in the case of 
cyber-wrongdoing may raise two additional difficulties. First, some jurisdictions 
require actual knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge, that the child’s use 
of the chattel would expose a third party to an unreasonable risk of injury.156 This 
does not preclude parental liability for juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, but surely curtails 
it. The plaintiff must establish the parent’s actual knowledge that the child is likely 
to use the device unreasonably.157 Second, many jurisdictions insist that the chattel 
 
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
151. Meier v. Schrock, 405 S.W.3d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
152. Walther, supra note 3, at 558–59. 
153. Id. at 560. 
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. b. 
155. See, e.g., Killeen v. Harmon Grain Prods., Inc., 413 N.E.2d 767, 771 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); 
Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 768 n.24 (Mich. 1977). 
156. See, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 570 N.E.2d 93, 96–97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Walther, supra 
note 3, at 550–52. 
157. Walther, supra note 3, at 558–62. 
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be “inherently dangerous.”158 Most courts have adopted a restrictive interpretation 
of this term, recognizing only automobiles and firearms as inherently dangerous.159 
If a parent gives the child access to a car or a gun, knowing that the child could not 
be trusted with such devices, and the child harms someone by misusing the device, 
then the parent can be sued for negligent entrustment.160 In contrast, electronic 
devices and applications are not dangerous in the classical sense.161 Thus, for 
example, the court in the seminal cyberbullying case of Finkel v. Dauber162 held that 
a computer system is not “inherently dangerous.”163 
The second theory of liability is negligent supervision. In many states, when a 
child commits a tort, the parent is liable for failing to exercise reasonable care in 
controlling the child if two conditions are met: (1) the parent knows or has reason 
to know that he or she has the ability to control the child, and (2) the parent knows 
of or should know of the necessity and opportunity of exercising such control.164 
Traditionally, many courts have found no foreseeability and hence no duty of care 
unless the plaintiff showed that the parent-defendant knew, or at least should have 
known, of the child’s dangerous propensity.165 The Third Restatement of Torts aims 
to subsume such factors within a more general analysis of reasonable care.166 The 
negligent supervision theory can be applied to cases of cyberbullying when the 
perpetrator’s parents are aware or should be aware of the wrongdoing and can 
prevent it. For example, in Boston v. Athearn,167 the court held that parents could be 
held liable for negligently failing to supervise their child’s use of the family computer 
and Internet account to defame his peer (by faking and abusing a Facebook account 
under her name), at least after they were informed of his misconduct.168 Note, 
however, that not all states recognize this doctrine. For instance, the court in Finkel 
v. Dauber169 held that “there is no cause of action for negligent supervision of a 
 
158. See, e.g., Evans v. Shannon, 776 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Ill. 2002); Kennedy v. Baird, 682 
S.W.2d 377, 378–79 (Tex. App. 1984); Walther, supra note 3, at 552–57. 
159. See, e.g., Wilbanks v. Brazil, 425 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Ala. 1983) (“[A]ll cases arising under 
the negligent entrustment doctrine have involved entrustment of vehicles, boats, firearms, or 
explosives . . . .”); Brewster v. Rankins, 600 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a golf 
club is not an inherently dangerous instrument); Walther, supra note 3, at 553. 
160. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166  
U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1108 (2018). 
161. Heller, supra note 50, at 173. 
162. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
163. Id. at 702. 
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); Heller, supra note 50, at 169–70; Habeeb, supra note 139, § 10. 
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“There 
must . . . be some specific propensity of the child, of which the parent has notice.”). Many courts 
consider “dangerous propensity” a precondition for a finding of foreseeability. See, e.g., Fuller v. Studer, 
833 P.2d 109, 113 (Idaho 1992) (finding no dangerous propensity); Porter, supra note 116, at 558–61. 
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM  
§ 41 reporter’s note to cmt c (AM. LAW INST. 2012); Porter, supra note 116, at 565–67, 569–70. 
167. Boston v. Athearn, 764 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). 
168. Id. at 587. 
169. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
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child, absent an allegation that the parent entrusted the child with a dangerous 
instrument which caused harm to a third party.”170 As a comparative note, some 
Canadian provinces impose liability based on negligent supervision with a reverse 
burden of proof through specific legislation.171 
In most jurisdictions, the parents are not under any duty to supervise their 
child when he or she is at school or taking part in a school activity; only school 
personnel and the school itself can be held liable for failing to supervise a student 
who committed a wrong under these circumstances.172 Still, in some Romance 
jurisdictions, the parents may be held liable for breach of a duty to educate the child, 
if lack of proper education results in wrongdoing at school.173 In some Germanic 
jurisdictions, when the child is at school, the parents’ duty to supervise is reduced 
to a duty to reasonably verify that the school exercises proper supervision (and this 
duty is presumably fulfilled if the school is public).174 
The third and last theory of liability, which in essence is a generalization of the 
previous two, is negligent enabling of a tort.175 Some jurisdictions hold a parent 
liable for an injury caused by the child if the parent’s negligence made it possible for 
the child to cause the injury and probable that the child would do so.176 Providing 
a child, especially an ill-disciplined adolescent, with unlimited and unsupervised 
Internet access may enable cyber-wrongdoing. Goldberg and Zipursky observe that 
“courts continue to resist the dilution of the circumscribed concept of negligent 
entrustment into the much broader concept of negligent enabling . . . . [T]hey reject 
the composite assertion . . . that carelessness increasing the risk of misconduct by 
another” calls for liability in negligence.177 But while the idea of negligent enabling 
is open-ended and therefore controversial, courts have widely recognized such a 
 
170. Id. at 702. 
171. See, e.g., Parental Liability Act, S.B.C. 2001, c 45, § 3, 6, 9 (Can.) (imposing liability for 
property damage caused by the child unless parents can establish non-negligence; limiting liability to 
CAD 10,000); The Parental Responsibility Act, S.M. 1996, c 61, § 3, 7 (Can.) (same); Parental 
Responsibility Act, S.O. 2000, c 4, § 2 (Can.) in conjunction with the Small Claims Courts Jurisdiction 
and Appeal Limit, O. Reg. 626/00, § 1 (Can.) (same, with a CAD 35,000 limit). 
172. See Martín-Casals, supra note 120, at 465; Oliphant, supra note 116, at 163, 165–66. 
173. See, e.g., Comandé & Nocco, supra note 149, at 278, 283–84 (discussing “culpa in educando”); 
Maria Manuel Veloso, Children as Tortfeasors Under Portuguese Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART 
I: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 311, 335 (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2006) (discussing “culpa  
in eligendo”). 
174. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 149, at 47, 61; Martín-Casals, supra note 120, at 465; Wagner, 
supra note 149, at 247, 263. 
175. Cf. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 438–43 (1999) (discussing 
the concept and enabling situations). 
176. Buelke v. Levenstadt, 214 P. 42, 44 (Cal. 1923); see also Langford v. Shu, 128 S.E.2d 210, 
212–13 (N.C. 1962) (“A parent is liable for the act of his child if the parent’s conduct was such as to 
render his own negligence a proximate cause of the injury complained of.”); Condel v. Savo, 39 A.2d 
51, 52 (Pa. 1944) (“[T]he parents may be liable . . . where the negligence of the parents makes the injury 
possible.”). 
177. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The 
Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211,  
1225 (2009). 
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general principle in parent-child settings.178 A greater obstacle in the current context 
is that the principle has only been used with respect to physical harm.179 
Parents’ liability ameliorates some of the practical difficulties with the child’s 
liability—legal obstacles associated with the defendant’s age and the problem of 
judgment-proof defendants. However, the technological barrier of anonymity must 
be equally addressed when tort actions against wrongdoers’ parents are concerned. 
If the victim cannot identify the wrongdoer, neither can he or she identify and bring 
an action against a parent, unless someone perpetrated the wrongdoing through the 
parent’s electronic device, and it is unclear which child was the culprit. This 
observation is crucial for the construction of an efficient liability model.
2. Teachers, Schools, and Education Authorities
As with parents, the most plausible theory of liability in an action against 
educators and schools is independent negligence.180 In all Western jurisdictions, 
common law and civil law alike, teachers and schools are under a duty to reasonably 
supervise students, and if failure to comply causes harm, it is actionable in tort.181 
This duty usually applies when the children are on school premises, even if they are 
not in class, or when they take part in out-of-school activities organized by the 
school.182 To the extent that the educator in charge is employed by a private 
institution or a public authority, the employer’s liability will usually be vicarious,183 
although the institution or the authority can be directly liable if fault can be 
attributed thereto.184 
Negligent supervision actions may face several obstacles. For instance, in 
some jurisdictions, schools owe students a duty to properly supervise school 
personnel and students in order to prevent physical injury but not emotional harm, 
which is the prevalent outcome of cyberbullying.185 Additionally, in most 
jurisdictions, school districts and public school employees may invoke 
governmental immunity in cases of negligence in policymaking or in the exercise of 
discretionary functions, as opposed to operational conduct.186 The immunity does 
 
178. See Habeeb, supra note 139, § 9. 
179. See id. 
180. See Fenn, supra note 27, at 2739–46 (“In cases where a victim of on-campus bullying by 
another student wishes to hold a school district or its employees liable, the victim must show negligence 
on the part of the school.”). 
181. See, e.g., Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658, 666 (Fla. 1982); see also Martín-Casals, supra note 
120, at 459 (reviewing the law in European jurisdictions). 
182. Martín-Casals, supra note 120, at 459. 
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
184. Oliphant, supra note 116, at 166. 
185. See, e.g., Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968–69 
(D. Kan. 2005) (applying Kansas law). 
186. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557n (2019); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10 / 2-201 
(West 2018) (as interpreted in Albers v. Breen, 806 N.E.2d 667, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004));  
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(1) (2019) (as interpreted in Bowers v. City of Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d 
427, 430–31 (Tenn. 1992)); Estate of Girard v. Town of Putnam, No. CV085002754-S, 2011 WL 78599, 
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not apply where the supervision of students generally or the specific failures are 
deemed “operational” rather than “discretionary.”187 In many jurisdictions, 
immunity cannot be invoked if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant was 
grossly negligent188 or acted willfully.189 In some, it is precluded “when the 
circumstances make it apparent to [a] public officer that his or her failure to act 
would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm.”190 
In the United States, federal legislation provides additional bases for liability. 
First, a victim of cyber-harassment at a public school can bring an action against the 
school pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1983,191 where allowing the aggressor’s misconduct 
violates the victim’s constitutional rights.192 For example, in T.E. v. Pine Bush Central 
School District,193 Jewish students who suffered anti-Semitic harassment, including 
verbal and physical threats,194 brought a lawsuit against the school district under  
§ 1983 for the violation of the Equal Protection Clause.195 The court denied a 
motion to dismiss, holding that to succeed in such an action, the plaintiff must 
satisfy three conditions: (1) the victim was harassed by other students based on 
membership in a protected group, such as race; (2) the harassment was known to 
the school; (3) the school’s response was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known 
circumstances,” to the extent that an intent to harass can be attributed to the 
school.196 In contrast, it seems clear that violation of state statutes on bullying in 
general, and cyberbullying in particular,197 does not provide a basis for a claim under 
§ 1983.198 
 
at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2011); Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 646 (Va. 2012); Fenn, supra 
note 27, at 2742–43 (discussing the immunity). 
187. See Wyke v. Polk Cty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 571 (11th Cir. 1997). 
188. See, e.g., Burns, 727 S.E.2d at 646–47 (explaining that an individual entitled to the protection 
of sovereign immunity may be liable if grossly negligent). 
189. See, e.g., Chisolm v. Tippens, 658 S.E.2d 147, 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that the 
immunity does not apply in the case of willful conduct). 
190. Grady v. Town of Somers, 984 A.2d 684, 690 (Conn. 2009). 
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2019) (“Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law . . . .”). 
192. Liability of private schools under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2019) is more limited. 
193. T.E. v. Pine Bush Cent. Sch. Dist., 58 F. Supp. 3d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
194. Id. at 339–50. 
195. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
196. T.E., 58 F. Supp. 3d at 368. But cf. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of  
Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 371 F. App’x 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding, in a  
§ 1983 claim for sexual harassment, that the third condition was not met). 
197. See supra notes 25–26. 
198. See O’Dell v. Casa Grande Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 4, No. CV-08-0240-PHX-GMS, 2008  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100968, at *19–20 (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 2008) (discussing Arizona anti-bullying 
legislation, holding that a violation of state law cannot be a basis for a § 1983 action because the section 
provides a remedy for “deprivation of rights secured by the Federal Constitution and Laws.”); Chisolm 
v. Tippens, 658 S.E.2d 147, 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing Georgia anti-bullying legislation, 
holding § 1983 does not apply to violations of state laws). 
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Second, in limited cases, a juvenile cyberbullying victim can bring an action 
against the school pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibits a recipient of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race, color, 
or national origin.199 The United States Department of Education’s regulations 
elaborate further that a recipient of federal funds may not, “on ground of race, color, 
or national origin . . . [r]estrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any 
advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or 
benefit under the program.”200 Similarly, a recipient cannot “[d]eny an individual an 
opportunity to participate in the program through the provision of services or 
otherwise or afford him an opportunity to do so which is different from that 
afforded others under the program” on the basis of race, color, or national origin.201 
In the T.E. case, the court held that anti-Semitic harassment amounts to racial 
discrimination.202 A school district can be liable under Title VI if four conditions 
are met:203 (1) the school had substantial control over the circumstances, normally 
because the misconduct occurred during school hours and on school grounds; (2) 
the harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive and discriminatory, 
in the sense that it generated a “systemic effect of denying the victim equal access 
to an educational program or activity, and more than episodic”; (3) the school 
actually knew about the harassment (constructive knowledge is insufficient); and (4) 
the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment, making its actions “clearly 
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”204 In the limited context of 
cyber-harassment based on race, color, or national origin, and perpetrated by public 
school students, school districts can be liable if the four conditions are met. 
Third, in the appropriate cases, a juvenile cyber-harassment victim may bring 
an action against the (public) school based on Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act of 1972,205 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex 
(including sexual orientation206) in educational institutions receiving federal funding, 
or on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,207 which prohibits disability-based 
discrimination in such institutions. The analysis of claims under Title IV applies 
mutatis mutandis to claims under these two statutes, which cover additional 
categories of discrimination. For example, in R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Board of Education of 
Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free School District,208 a student sued the school district 
 
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2019). 
200. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(1)(iv) (2019). 
201. Id. § 100.3(b)(1)(vi) (2019). 
202. T.E. v. Pine Bush Cent. Sch. Dist., 58 F. Supp. 3d 332, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
203. Id. at 355. 
204. Id. at 355–56. 
205. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2019). 
206. See Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 963–65  
(D. Kan. 2005) (holding on the basis of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) 
and its progeny that same-sex student-on-student harassment is actionable under Title IX). 
207. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2019).
208. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 371  
F. App’x 231 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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under Title IX for sexual harassment by another student, who sent her three 
harassing e-mails. The court held that the record was insufficient “to permit a 
reasonable jury to find that S.S. endured harassment so severe and pervasive as to 
have effectively denied her access to educational resources and opportunities.”209 
In other words, the harassment did not satisfy the severity requirement, which sets 
a high threshold for recovery. 
Lastly, victims of juvenile cyber-wrongdoing may occasionally sue the school 
district under state anti-discrimination legislation. For example, in L.W. v. Toms 
River Regional Schools Board of Education,210 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held 
that the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination211 recognizes a cause of action 
against a school district for student-on-student sexual-orientation harassment if the 
school district knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to take 
reasonable actions to end it.212 Similarly, in Doe v. Kansas City, Missouri School 
District,213 the Court of Appeals of Missouri held that the state’s Human Rights 
Act214 allows a claim against a school district for student-on-student sexual 
harassment if the district knew or should have known of the harassment but failed 
to take action.215 Although these were real-life harassment cases, the same principles 
apply to cyber-harassment. 
Schools’ liability for juvenile cyber-wrongdoing may raise several problems. 
The most fundamental concern is that any duty to supervise and limit students’ 
cyber-communications might infringe on their freedom of speech.216 Students do 
not enjoy the same level of constitutional protection as adults due to the “special 
characteristics of the school environment.”217 Yet the boundaries of schools’ 
supervision duties must be consistent with the boundaries of students’ First 
Amendment rights. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,218 
the Supreme Court limited school districts’ power to regulate and punish students’ 
speech to instances in which on-campus expression “materially and substantially 
interfer[es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
 
209. Id. at 233. 
210. L.W. v. Toms River Reg’l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535 (N.J. 2007). 
211. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2019) (“All persons shall have the opportunity  
to . . . obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public 
accommodation . . . without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, 
marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, disability . . . nationality, sex . . . . This 
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.”). 
212. L.W., 915 A.2d at 540. 
213. Doe v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
214. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.065(2) (2019) (“It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any 
person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person . . . any of the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of public 
accommodation . . . or to segregate or discriminate against any such person in the use thereof on the 
grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability.”). 
215. Doe, 372 S.W.3d at 54. 
216. Fenn, supra note 27, at 2749. 
217. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007). 
218. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 513 (1969). 
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school” or involves “invasion of the rights of others.”219 According to subsequent 
case law, schools can also regulate on-campus student expression when it is 
“offensively lewd and indecent” (and “unrelated to a political viewpoint”),220 or 
might be reasonably perceived as bearing the school’s imprimatur, such as a school 
newspaper or play,221 or promotes criminal activity, such as drug use.222 When a 
school unlawfully prevents ex ante or punishes ex post a student’s potentially harmful 
cyber-communication, the latter can pursue an injunction223 or claim damages for 
violation of his or her First Amendment rights under § 1983.224 
An additional problem is that schools’ power may not equally extend to  
off-campus activities.225 For instance, in Morse v. Frederick, 226 the Supreme Court 
opined that had the offensively lewd and indecent speech discussed in a previous 
case been delivered “in a public forum outside the school context, it would have 
been protected.” To be sure, some federal and state courts held that schools can 
regulate and discipline for off-campus cyber-wrongdoing which might materially 
and substantially disrupt school life, as per Tinker.227 Still, it is unlikely that the 
 
219. Id. at 513; Papandrea, supra note 4, at 1038–45 (discussing the Tinker test and 
its applications). 
220. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
221. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
222. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
223. See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 
(awarding an injunction against a school that suspended a student who created a website critical of the 
school). 
224. See, e.g., J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(discussing a claim against a school for suspending a student who posted a video of her friends talking 
in a disparaging fashion about a classmate); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374, 1377 
(S.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing a lawsuit against a school for suspending a student who created a Facebook 
page to share students’ hatred for a teacher); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage  
Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (finding a school liable for disciplining a student 
who created a parody profile of the school’s principal on an internet website after school hours). 
225. See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (explaining that schools’ authority over off-campus 
expression is much more limited than expression on school grounds); Kristopher L. Jiles, Trigger Fingers 
Turn to Twitter Fingers: The Evolution of the Tinker Standard and its Impact on Cyberbullying amongst 
Adolescents, 61 HOW. L.J. 641, 655 (2018) (same); Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone  
Viral: Diverging Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3395, 3416–19 (2014) (same); Papandrea, supra note 4, at 1028–30 (same); Poole, 
supra note 2, at 252 (same). 
226. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). 
227. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48–50 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] student may be 
disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when this conduct 
‘would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at least when 
it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.”); Wisniewski  
v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We have 
recognized that off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a 
school [citations omitted].”); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist.,  
No. CV 08-5671, 2008 WL 4396869, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (applying Tinker to off-campus 
YouTube video calling to kill teacher); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002) 
(holding that the communication contained in a “Teacher Sux” website caused actual and substantial 
disruption of the work of the school); see also MINN. STAT. § 121A.031(a)(3) (2018) (applying to  
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school would be allowed to regulate conduct which is neither carried out on its 
premises nor has a significant impact on its activities.228 Punishing off-campus 
cyber-wrongdoing without legal authority may give rise to claims not only for 
infringements of the freedom of speech but also for Due Process violations.229 
C. Virtual Supervisors 
1. The American Model
An additional layer in any civil law response to cyberbullying is secondary or 
indirect liability of virtual supervisors, namely platforms that enable juvenile  
cyber-activity and cyber-wrongdoing, such as Facebook, Gmail, Instagram or 
YouTube. In the United States, however, it is almost impossible to bring a lawsuit 
against a virtual supervisor for wrongful user-contributions, even if it knew about 
their wrongful nature. The explanation goes back to the traditional distinction in 
defamation law among three types of intermediaries: (1) common carriers, such as 
telephone companies, which only transmit information and are not liable for 
defamation;230 (2) distributors, such as bookstore owners, which distribute content 
without having control over it and are liable only if they knew or had reason to 
know about the defamatory nature of the publication;231 and (3) publishers, such as 
newspapers, which exercise significant control over published content and are 
subject to strict liability.232 In the context of online defamation, this framework 
generated skewed incentives. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,233 the court held that 
CompuServe, which provided users with access to a virtual newsletter but did not 
review its content, was a mere distributor and therefore not liable for false and 
defamatory statements made therein.234 Conversely, in Stratton Oakmont,  
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,235 the court found that Prodigy, a bulletin board operator 
that exercised some editorial control over user-generated content, was a publisher, 
and could be held liable for defamatory statements made by an anonymous user 
 
off-campus cyberbullying that “substantially and materially disrupts student learning or the  
school environment”). 
228. Jiles, supra note 225, at 658–59. 
229. See, e.g., J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094  
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that a student’s Due Process was violated when she was suspended after an 
off-campus posting of a video disparaging a schoolmate); Poole, supra note 2, at 254–55. 
230. Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation 
Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651 (2002). 
231. Id. at 651–52. 
232. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 184 (4th  
ed. 2011). 
233. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
234. Id. at 141. 
235. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710  
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996,  
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133, 137. 
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with respect to a brokerage firm.236 The joint reading of Cubby and Stratton Oakmont 
incentivized platform operators to avoid moderating online discourse because 
moderating exposed them to the risk of liability, whereas not moderating protected 
them from liability.237 
Pressures from the Internet industry quickly led to the enactment of 
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,238 whereby providers of 
“interactive computer services” should not be considered publishers of “any 
information provided by another information content provider.”239 In Zeran  
v. America Online, Inc.,240 the court held that section 230 “creates a federal immunity 
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information 
originating with a third-party user of the service.”241 In particular, a message board 
operator could not be found liable for defamatory postings by an anonymous user, 
even though the operator had relevant knowledge after a certain point and would 
have been considered a publisher under traditional defamation law.242 The court 
explained that imposing liability on platform operators just because they had 
knowledge about the wrongful content would defeat the purposes of section  
230: promoting free speech on the one hand, and encouraging platforms’  
self-regulation on the other.243 If platform operators were subject to  
knowledge-based liability, receiving a notification about a potentially wrongful 
statement would require making a “careful yet rapid investigation of the 
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment concerning the 
information’s defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether 
to risk liability by allowing the continued publication of that information.”244 The 
vast number of postings would create “an impossible burden in the Internet 
context.”245 Because platform operators would be liable only for the publication of 
information and not for its removal, they would have a strong incentive to simply 
remove content upon notification.246
Following Zeran, section 230 has provided online platforms, be they 
publishers or distributors under traditional law,247 with effective immunity from 
 
236. Id. at *4–5; see also Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 
650–51 (2014) (discussing the impact of Stratton Oakmont). Some of the statements about the firm were 
later found to be true, but it was too late for the defendant. See Joe Nocera, Sex and Drugs and  
I.P.O.’s: Martin Scorsese’s Approach in ‘The Wolf of Wall Street,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/movies/martin-scorseses-approach-in-the-wolf-of-wall- 
street.html [https://perma.cc/L37B-VN8D]. 
237. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
238. Communications Decency Act § 230 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018)). 
239. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
240. Zeran, 129 F.3d 327.  
241. Id. at 330. 
242. Id. at 330–32. 
243. Id. at 333. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id.
247. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 519 (Cal. 2006) (“There is even less reason to 
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liability for user-generated content.248 The immunity covers all kinds of platforms, 
including social networking websites and applications, such as Facebook or 
Twitter,249 search engines, such as Google and Yahoo,250 operators of online 
business-review systems, such as Yelp,251 e-commerce platforms, such as 
Amazon,252 and operators of online message boards253 and chat rooms.254 
Furthermore, the immunity applies to all relevant causes of action, including 
defamation, privacy invasions, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil 
rights violations.255 As noted above, the immunity applies even if the platform knew 
or should have known about the wrongdoing256 or acted negligently with respect to 
user wrongdoing.257 
2. Alternatives and Calls for Reform 
The American position on this matter is exceptional. In the European Union, 
for example, a victim of online defamation can frequently bring an action against 
the platform. Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive258 provides that some 
intermediaries, such as hosting service providers, are liable only if they knew about 
the wrongful statement and failed to remove it following the victim’s request (a 
 
suppose that Congress intended to immunize ‘publishers’ but leave ‘distributors’ open to liability, when 
the responsibility of publishers for offensive content is greater than that of mere distributors.”). 
248. However, empirical studies have shown that more than one-third of such claims survive 
the section 230 defense, and accordingly websites often have to engage in long and expensive legal 
battles. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary 
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 493 (2010); 
Chander, supra note 236, at 655. 
249. Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1065–66 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding 
that Facebook “provides an interactive computer service” for the purposes of section 230). 
250. Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (holding that  
“Yahoo! should be entitled to immunity because it acted as an interactive computer service”). 
251. Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“Yelp qualifies as an 
‘interactive computer service’ within the meaning of the CDA.”). 
252. Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1105–07 (W.D. Wash. 2014) 
(concluding that Amazon is an interactive computer service provider). 
253. DiMeo v. Max, 248 F. App’x. 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that an online message 
board operator is an interactive computer service provider). 
254. Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013–17 (Fla. 2001) (holding that America 
Online, the operator of a chat room in which a third party posted obscene images of the plaintiff’s son, 
is immune under section 230). 
255. See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The majority of 
federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad federal immunity to any cause of action 
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the 
service.”); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 171 (2014) (listing relevant 
causes of action); Chander, supra note 236, 651 (“[Section 230] largely immunized online service 
providers from secondary liability for most torts committed through their service.”). For an extensive 
list of cases, see Chander, supra note 236, at 653 n.58. 
256. CITRON, supra note 255, at 171. 
257. Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003). 
258. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 14 ( July 17, 2000). 
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notice-and-takedown regime). This means, first, that knowledge can generate 
liability. Moreover, many platforms are not considered intermediaries for these 
purposes, and may be liable even in the absence of knowledge about the wrongful 
content. In the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia,259 the European Court of Human Rights 
held that a news website was liable for defamation in anonymous user comments.260 
The court agreed that the website was a publisher rather than an intermediary, and 
that it was not exempt from the duty to monitor or from liability despite 
implementing a notice-and-takedown system.261 In mid-June 2015, the Grand 
Chamber of the court upheld the earlier decision, possibly limiting its application to 
news portals.262 
A more structured approach was endorsed in the United Kingdom, where the 
Defamation Act links the platform’s liability to the speaker’s unavailability.263 
Section 5(2) stipulates that a website operator is generally not liable for a defamatory 
statement posted on the website if it was not the one who posted that statement.264 
However, the defense can be defeated (and the operator exposed to liability) if the 
victim had insufficient information to identify and bring proceedings against the 
speaker, the victim gave notice of the complaint, and the operator did not properly 
respond to the complaint.265 A proper response requires obtaining the speaker’s 
contact information and providing it to the victim or removing the  
defamatory content.266 
Some commentators advocated replacing section 230 with a  
notice-and-takedown regime, which is not only comparable to the European 
model,267 but has also been applied in the United States to copyright infringement 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).268 According to the DMCA, 
where an Internet service provider offers system caching, information storage, or 
information location tools, and it receives actual notice of the infringing material, it 
must remove the content or risk liability through the loss of immunity.269 Others 
proposed a more limited reform, using a notice-and-takedown model only with 
respect to cyber-wrongdoing against children. When a platform operator is notified 
 
259. Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 94. 
260. Id. at paras. 28, 50, 94. See also Mart Susi, International Decision: Delfi AS v. Estonia, 108 
AM. J. INT’L L. 295 passim (2014) (discussing the Delfi decision). 
261. Delfi, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 28, 50. 
262. Delfi AS v. Estonia, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319, paras. 62, 115, 159.  
263. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (U.K.). 
264. Id. § 5(2). 
265. Id. § 5(3)–(4). 
266. Id. § 5(3)(c), (5). 
267. A notice-and-takedown regime was also adopted in non-European jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Harmful Digital Communication Act 2015, s 24 (N.Z.) (“No civil or criminal proceedings may be 
brought against an online content host in respect of the content complained of . . . if the online content 
host—(a) receives a notice of complaint about the specific content; and (b) complies with [a  
takedown process].”). 
268. Areheart, supra note 43, at 43. 
269. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d) (2018).
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that a child is being harassed through the platform, the operator would be obliged 
to remove the offending content or cut off the offender’s access to the site.270 Yet 
none of these proposals have been seriously considered by Congress, so the 
absolute immunity holds. 
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
A. The Wrongdoer 
1. Outline 
At first glance, a cyber-wrongdoer’s liability is a special case of direct tort 
liability, so its economic justifications should be similar.271 Efficient deterrence 
entails internalization by the wrongdoer of the social harm caused by his or her 
wrongful (that is, inefficient) conduct.272 Only if expected liability is equivalent to 
the expected externalized cost273 will the potential injurer internalize that cost and 
take cost-effective precautions.274 In the context of juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, 
three attributes of the wrongdoers undermine the deterrent effect of liability: (1) 
inability to compensate; (2) limited cognitive, emotional, and social capacity; and (3) 
possible anonymity. 
2. Inability to Compensate 
Children and adolescents are generally judgment-proof defendants: even if 
found liable, they do not have the resources to compensate their victims.275 If 
injurers are unable to fully compensate for harms caused, they will not internalize 
the social cost of their conduct. From their perspective, the expected expense may 
be considerably lower than the expected (social) harm, so the incentive for choosing 
the optimal level of care is impaired.276 For example, assume that there is a 
probability of 0.02 that A’s conduct will cause a $100,000 loss to B, and that A can 
reduce the probability of harm to 0.01 by adopting a certain precaution for $800. 
 
270. Poole, supra note 2, at 245–50, 260. 
271. See, e.g., Alain Sheer & Asghar Zardkoohi, An Analysis of the Economic Efficiency of the Law 
of Defamation, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 364 (1985) (analyzing the goals and consequences of defamation law 
from an economic perspective). 
272. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 328 (2012); 
Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive Damages, and the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 45  
GA. L. REV. 407, 426 (2011); Ronen Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 987, 990, 994–95 (2008); Ronen 
Perry, Strike-Out, 68 ALA. L. REV. 445, 472 (2016). 
273. In cases of negligence-based liability, expected liability may exceed expected  
externalized cost. 
274. Miller & Perry, supra note 272, at 346. 
275. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1986) 
(defining judgment-proof defendants). 
276. See Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-Proof Problem, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (1994); 
Shavell, supra note 275, at 45; Comment, The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic Analysis, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 157–59 (1983). 
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The cost of care ($800) is lower than the ensuing reduction in expected harm 
((0.020.01)$100,000=$1,000), so the law needs to incentivize A to take this 
precaution. Now assume that the expected value of A’s assets during the subsequent 
litigation is $30,000 and that A is risk-neutral. Liability would not provide an 
adequate incentive for choosing the optimal level of care. Under a negligence rule, 
the expected sanction for failing to take the efficient precaution would be only 
0.02$30,000=$600, whereas the cost of precaution is $800. Under a strict liability 
regime, A would only save (0.020.01)$30,000=$300 by taking an $800 
precaution. Either way, A will not take the necessary precaution.277 
As law and economics literature demonstrates, primary wrongdoers’ liability is 
inefficient, and supervisors’ liability may be desirable, if the wrongdoer is  
judgment-proof.278 Specifically, one of the main justifications for employers’ 
vicarious liability is that employees are frequently judgment-proof defendants. 
Employees’ deterrence is sub-optimal, so an alternative liability model is necessary 
to avoid inefficient conduct.279 The same rationale applies a fortiori to minors, who 
rarely have any assets. Given juvenile wrongdoers’ inability to pay,280 imposing 
liability on them would frequently be inefficient. Liability would not deter potential 
wrongdoers and only entail considerable administrative costs. A substantive defense 
may be justified, at least if efficient conduct can be secured through another  
liability model. 
3. Limited Cognitive, Emotional, and Social Capacity 
Children and adolescents might not be able to fully grasp the wrongfulness of 
their conduct, and even when they do, they might not be able to rationally respond 
to the risks.281 The reasons may vary across age groups. Young children might be 
unable to predict the negative consequences of their conduct,282 undermining any 
attempt to incentivize care through internalization of risk. Even when they can 
evaluate the risks, they might be unable to determine whether the likelihood of 
negative consequences makes their conduct morally undesirable and legally 
 
277. Note that the incentive to take care is sharper under a negligence rule, because injurers can 
avoid liability entirely by choosing the proper level of care rather than only reduce its probability. 
Shavell, supra note 275, at 47. 
278. Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of 
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 passim (1988) [hereinafter Sykes, 
The Boundaries]; Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 passim (1984) 
[hereinafter Sykes, The Economics]. 
279. Sykes, The Boundaries, supra note 278, at 567–68. 
280. See Areheart, supra note 43, at 42–43 (noting that most cyberbullies are judgment-proof); 
Walther, supra note 3, at 546 (same). 
281. Areheart, supra note 43, at 43. 
282. See, e.g., Jodie M. Plumert & David C. Schwebel, Social and Temperamental Influences on 
Children’s Overestimation of Their Physical Abilities: Links to Accidental Injuries, 67 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
CHILD PSYCHOL. 317, 318 (1997) (“[I]mmature cognitive skills such as errors in judging danger or the 
inability to foresee consequences may put children at risk for accidents.”). 
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wrong;283 and even if they fully realize the risks, and conclude that the risks make 
the conduct wrongful, civil liability might not be the sort of sanction that deters 
wrongdoing. Children would not be very impressed by a story about a judicial 
process in which they may be required to pay an amount of money they cannot 
predict and do not possess. Still, young children pose a lesser risk of cyberbullying. 
They are more closely supervised by adults, and less likely to have access to 
electronic means of communication and to use them to communicate with peers. 
Adolescents raise a different and much greater problem, not only because they 
have access to electronic means of communication and intensively use them, but 
also because they are more inclined to irrationally take risks.284 Research shows that 
by mid-adolescence, around the age of fifteen, individuals’ cognitive capacity to 
make rational decisions, involving individual cost-benefit analysis, is similar to that 
of adults under neutral conditions.285 However, under emotional stimuli, 
adolescents are more prone to acting irrationally, making emotion-based decisions 
with inadequate cognitive oversight, and ignoring risks that adults would take into 
account.286 Adolescent risk-taking generally, and offensive conduct in particular, can 
be partly understood as arising from a “maturity gap” between cognitive and 
intellectual development on the one hand, and emotional and psychosocial 
development on the other.287 Emotional and social deficiencies might overwhelm 
their capacity for rational choice and lead to reckless and potentially  
harmful conduct.288 
Several phenomena contribute to this inclination to take risks. First, a 
substantial body of research demonstrates that adolescents are more sensitive to 
rewards, more inclined to reward-seeking than adults (and children), give more 
weight to rewards, particularly social rewards, and therefore discount risks in making 
choices.289 Quick and considerable development of the neurobiological 
socioemotional system around the time of puberty leads to an increase in  
 
283. See, e.g., Nancy Eisenberg-Berg, Development of Children’s Prosocial Moral Judgment, 15 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 128 (1979) (finding that elementary school children’s reasoning “tended 
to be hedonistic, stereotyped, approval and interpersonally oriented, and/or involved the labeling of 
others’ needs.”). 
284. See, e.g., Brooke A. Ammerman et al., Risk-Taking Behavior and Suicidality: The Unique 
Role of Adolescent Drug Use, 47 J. CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 131, 132 (2018) (“[I]t 
is generally agreed that adolescence is a developmental period marked by the emergence and escalation 
of risk-taking . . . and that these behaviors increase from early to late adolescence.”); Natasha Duell et 
al., Age Patterns in Risk Taking Across the World, 47 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 1052, 1065 (2018) 
(“[A]dolescents demonstrate a heightened propensity, or inherent inclination, to take risks”); Laurence 
Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 
79 (2008) (“[A]dolescents engage in more risky behavior than adults.”). 
285. Elizabeth Scott et al., Brain Development, Social Context, and Justice Policy, 57  
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 29, 32–33, 34–35, 37–38 (2018). 
286. Id. at 30, 34–37. 
287. Id. at 20. 
288. Id. at 33. 
289. Id. at 13, 15, 20, 21–23; Steinberg, supra note 284, at 83. 
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reward-seeking, which peaks at around fifteen, and then starts to decrease.290 
Consequently, adolescents are shortsighted: they seek immediate rewards and 
discount future consequences of their deeds.291 Additionally, their sensitivity to 
rewards undermines their impulse control.292 
Second, research shows that sensation seeking increases from childhood to 
adolescence, peaks in the late adolescence years, and subsequently decreases.293 
Sensation seeking is the attraction to varied, novel, complex, and intense 
experiences, and the readiness to “take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for 
the sake of such experiences.”294 Sensation-seeking individuals underestimate or 
accept risks, including legal and financial risks, as the price for the reward provided 
by the experience.295 Adolescents, as sensation seekers, might overlook or 
undervalue risks and negative consequences of novel and thrilling activities, 
including various forms of bullying, thereby making irrational decisions.296 
Third, adolescents are more impulsive.297 The system of impulse control and 
emotional regulation develops gradually and slowly during adolescence and is not 
fully mature until the early to mid-twenties.298 In adolescence, this system “can be 
overwhelmed by emotional and social responses, contributing to short-sighted 
choices” without forethought and consideration of long-term costs.299 Adolescents 
might, therefore, act impulsively in the face of potentially harmful consequences 
and legal sanctions. The Supreme Court observed the limited deterrent effect of 
legal sanctions on teenagers in the context of capital punishment, holding that “[t]he 
likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that 
attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually 
nonexistent.”300 In a subsequent case, the Court added that “[a] lack of maturity and 
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in 
 
290. Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 216, 220 (2010). 
291. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 21, 23–24 (2018). 
292. Id. at 35.
293. K. Paige Harden et al., Developmental Differences in Reward Sensitivity and Sensation Seeking 
in Adolescence: Testing Sex-Specific Associations with Gonadal Hormones and Pubertal Development, 115 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 161, 161–62 (2018); Scott et al., supra note 285, at 31. 
294. MARVIN ZUCKERMAN, BEHAVIORAL EXPRESSIONS AND BIOSOCIAL BASES OF 
SENSATION SEEKING 27 (1994); Marvin Zuckerman, Sensation Seeking, in HANDBOOK OF 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 455, 462 (Mark R. Leary & Rick H. Hoyle  
eds., 2009). 
295. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 294, at 27. 
296. Id. 
297. For definitions of impulsivity, see F. Gerard Moeller et al., Psychiatric Aspects of Impulsivity, 
158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1783, 1783 (2001) (explaining that impulsivity is swift action without 
forethought and conscious judgement). 
298. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 13, 16, 21, 26–28, 31; Steinberg, supra note 290, at 216,  
220–21. 
299. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 26, 50.
300. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988). 
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adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result 
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”301 
Fourth, adolescents are more “sensitive to external social stimuli,” particularly 
peer pressure.302 “Recent research indicates that a network of brain systems 
governing thinking about social relationships undergoes significant changes in 
adolescence in ways that increase individuals’ concern about the opinion of 
other[s],” mostly peers.303 Susceptibility to peer pressure, especially pressure to 
engage in antisocial behavior, increases during early adolescence, peaks around age 
fourteen, and declines thereafter.304 This susceptibility combines with adolescents’ 
greater exposure to peer pressure. Adolescents spend more time with peers than 
children and adults, and use more intensive peer pressure to foster group solidarity 
and uniformity and to distinguish group members from nonmembers.305 Peer 
pressure may encourage misconduct when the peers are also reward seeking, 
sensation seeking, and impulsive, as is the case with adolescents. 
Even without any pressure, “the mere presence of peers activates the brain’s 
reward [centers] to a much greater extent among adolescents,” and increases their 
preference for immediate rewards, and inclination to take risks and behave in an 
antisocial manner.306 In fact, even if peers are not present, adolescents’ conduct is 
affected by anticipated peer response: they are more likely than adults to try 
impressing their peer group.307 Peer pressure, presence, or even anticipated 
endorsement can overcome incentives (moral, monetary, or other) to avoid 
wrongdoing. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the riskiest “behavior in which adolescents 
engage, [including] delinquency, substance use, and reckless driving, takes place in 
the company of peers.”308 Peer impact was identified by the Supreme Court as one 
of the features undermining legal attempts to deter adolescent misconduct through 
legal sanctions and justifying a more lenient legal response to  
juvenile wrongdoing.309 
 
301. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,  
367 (1993)). 
302. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 13, 15–16, 20, 24–25. 
303. Id. at 24; Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer 
Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1531 (2007) (observing that “there is little doubt that 
peers actually influence each other and that the effects of peer influence are stronger during adolescence 
than in adulthood”). 
304. Steinberg & Monahan, supra note 303, at 1531. 
305. Id. at 1531. 
306. Kaitlyn Breiner et al., Combined Effects of Peer Presence, Social Cues, and Rewards on 
Cognitive Control in Adolescents, 60 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 292, 292 (2018) 
(“Adolescents showed diminished cognitive control to positive social cues when anticipating a reward 
in the presence of peers relative to when alone, a pattern not observed in older participants.”); Scott et 
al., supra note 285, at 41–42, 43–44; Steinberg, supra note 284, at 85, 90–92 (explaining that peers make 
risky activities even more rewarding). 
307. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 50–51. 
308. Steinberg & Monahan, supra note 303, at 1531. 
309. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”). 
First to Printer_Perry.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/20/20  9:49 AM 
1254 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1219 
4. Anonymity
As explained above, technology facilitates anonymous misconduct, and this is 
indeed very common among adolescents.310 To bring an action against an 
anonymous wrongdoer, the victim needs to (1) obtain the perpetrator’s IP address 
from the platform operator, and (2) obtain the wrongdoer’s identity from the ISP, 
as identified by the IP address. As these two steps jeopardize both the anonymous 
user’s freedom of speech and his or her right to privacy, the legal process is cautious 
and complex, hence very costly. Moreover, sophisticated users can hide their IP 
addresses.311 Even when the real IP address used for wrongdoing can be 
ascertained, it may be very difficult to attribute the tort to a specific person if the 
tortfeasor was connected to a publicly accessible router312 or—perhaps  
illegally—to another person’s private router.313 An action against the wrongdoer 
may also be impossible if neither the platform nor the ISP retains a log of users’ 
activities for a long enough period (as actually occurred in Zeran).314 Finally, a legal 
disclosure mechanism would often be restricted by territorial boundaries, enabling 
anonymous wrongdoers using foreign websites or foreign ISPs to get off scot-free. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined the “territorial limits of [its] 
subpoena power.”315 It vacated a John Doe subpoena issued at the request of a 
Virginia carpet-cleaning business to a California-based business-rating website 
(Yelp), which published anonymous users’ negative reviews of the plaintiff, because 
the statements were published outside its jurisdiction.316 Had the defamatory 
statements been published in a different country, rather than a different state, the 
plaintiff would have faced even greater obstacles. 
 
310. Areheart, supra note 43, at 41–42; Calvert, supra note 9, at 20; Grant, supra note 2, at  
173–74, 198–99; Auerbach, supra note 2, at 1643–45; King, supra note 12, at 852; Poole, supra note 2, at 
243, 259; Sumrall, supra note 2, at 1479–80. 
311. See supra note 126. 
312. This was one of the reasons for denying a John Doe a subpoena in the copyright 
infringement case of VPR Internationale v. Does 1-1017, No. 11-2068, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64656, 
at *4 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011) (“The list of IP addresses attached to VPR’s complaint suggests . . . a 
similar disconnect between IP subscriber and copyright infringer. The ISPs include a number of 
universities, . . . as well as corporations and utility companies.”). 
313. See, e.g., Carolyn Thompson, Bizarre Pornography Raid Underscores Wi-Fi Privacy Risks, 
NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2011, 5:52:36 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42740201/ [https://
perma.cc/Z9TZ-28MH] (describing cases in which homeowners were accused of downloading child 
pornography but it later transpired that other parties had connected to the homeowners’ wireless 
routers to commit the offenses). 
314. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997). The cost of information 
retention is correlated with the amount of daily traffic and the required duration of retention. More 
importantly, retention laws should not infringe basic rights. On April 8, 2014, the European Court of 
Justice held that the EU Data Retention Directive, Directive 2006/24/EC, which required telecom 
companies to store user data for up to two years, was invalid because it infringed on the right to privacy 
and the right to the protection of personal data. Case C-293/12, Dig. Rights  
Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res., 2014 E.C.R. 238. 
315. Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440, 444 (Va. 2015). 
316. Id. at 445–46. 
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If identification of a potential defendant is technically impossible, this party 
will not internalize the social costs of the undesirable conduct; the mere existence 
of a cause of action will not generate any deterrent effect.317 If identification is 
possible, but its costs are prohibitively high, the victim might be deterred from 
bringing or continuing a valid lawsuit, undermining any deterrent effect of 
liability.318 If the victim is capable of and willing to establish the wrongdoer’s 
identity, the wrongdoer will internalize the costs of the wrongdoing, and efficient 
deterrence will be achieved (subject to the caveats concerning juvenile wrongdoers); 
but the administrative costs might outweigh the benefits in terms of cost-reducing 
deterrence, making the entire process inefficient.319 Finally, even if identification 
costs are lower than the benefits in terms of deterrence, their magnitude might 
render another party (for example, a virtual supervisor) a more cost-effective target 
for enforcement efforts. 
B. Real-Life Supervisors 
1. The Economic Justification for Liability 
The classical economic justification for supervisors’ liability has two 
complementary components.320 The first is the likelihood that the supervised would 
not be incentivized to avoid wrongful conduct by the prospect of liability, for 
example, because he or she is judgment-proof, or because of a limited cognitive, 
emotional, and social capacity. This component explains why primary wrongdoers’ 
liability is insufficient. The second component is the supervisor’s ability to take  
cost-effective measures to prevent wrongful conduct by the supervised. Supervisors 
can normally take two kinds of measures: (1) direct monitoring of the supervised, 
accompanied by reminders of the standard of conduct;321 and (2) creating an 
incentive structure for proper conduct.322 In the juvenile cyber-wrongdoing context, 
this may translate into educating children about the limits of cyber-activity, 
monitoring their activity, and implementing a reward-and-punishment system 
within the supervisor-child relationship. The important inquiry is always whether 
the cost of any measure is lower than the ensuing reduction in expected harm. 
Two questions arise at this juncture. First, which of the child’s real-life 
supervisors should bear the burden? Second, what kind of liability rule should be 
used? The first question requires identification of the cheapest cost avoider, namely 
the supervisor who can obtain the necessary information about the misconduct and 
take measures to prevent it at the lowest cost. Cheapest avoiders of real-world 
 
317. Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Who Should Be Liable for Online Anonymous Defamation?, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 162, 167 (2015). 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Sykes, The Boundaries, supra note 278, passim; Sykes, The Economics, supra note 278, passim. 
321. Sykes, The Boundaries, supra note 278, at 569 (discussing employers’ liability). 
322. Id. at 570 (discussing employers’ liability). 
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misconduct of others would normally be identified on the basis of temporal and 
spatial proximity. Schools were best situated to respond to children’s wrongdoing 
during schooltime, and parents (or caregivers) were the least cost avoiders at other 
times. Technology has somewhat changed this reality, as parents may be the only 
supervisors with access to electronic equipment used by their children. For example, 
if students harass their peer using instant messaging applications on their mobile 
phones, the school’s access to the content may be strictly limited. The proposed 
liability model assumes that control over the electronic equipment used by the 
wrongdoer is a key factor. This point will be elaborated below.323 
As regards the preferable rule, the starting point is that both strict-vicarious 
and negligence-based liability can incentivize supervisors to take risk-reducing 
measures when their cost is lower than the expected harm they can prevent.324 Law 
and economics literature provides some guidelines for choosing between the two. 
A negligence-based regime has an advantage where the supervisor could not have 
reasonably done anything to prevent the child’s wrongdoing, because imposition of 
liability in such circumstances (required under a strict liability rule) has no benefit 
from a deterrence perspective and generates considerable administrative costs.325 
Negligence-based liability does not have a similar weakness, because unavailability 
of reasonable precautions entails no liability. Admittedly, substantiating negligence 
is a costly process, and factual and legal uncertainties might result in over-deterrence 
and redundant, costly litigation. Yet litigation with no benefit in terms of deterrence 
is less likely under a negligence rule. Strict-vicarious liability may have an advantage 
over a negligent-supervision rule in terms of deterrence when “there is a significant 
risk of under-detection of the failures of the [supervisor’s] preventive measures.”326 
2. Power Without Information 
Reasonably educating children not to abuse technology to harm others, and 
responding decisively when cases of cyber-wrongdoing are detected, should not be 
very costly for real-life supervisors. But while these measures may somewhat reduce 
the risk of cyber-wrongdoing, they are inadequate. The main problem here is that 
real-life supervisors, especially parents, have considerable power to affect the 
conduct of supervised children, but lack the information necessary for exercising 
such control. There are several reasons for this.
First, supervisors of a school-age child cannot be reasonably expected to 
monitor in real time every deed and every word of that child. Such monitoring 
would disrupt other activities that supervisors carry out. Constant real-time 
monitoring may be cost-justified where the supervised poses a significant risk to 
 
323. See infra Section II.D.3.
324. Strict liability also induces efficient activity levels, whereas a classical negligence rule  
does not. 
325. Catherine M. Sharkey, Institutional Liability for Employees’ Intentional Torts: Vicarious 
Liability as a Quasi-Substitute for Punitive Damages, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019). 
326. Id. at 5. 
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himself or herself (as in the case of toddlers) or to others (as in the case of inmates), 
but seems excessive and unrealistic in the case of school-age children. Thus, parents 
and school personnel rarely witness children’s cyber-activity as it unfolds and cannot 
immediately respond to misconduct. Second, whether we consider constant  
real-time monitoring or mere periodic review of the child’s cyber-activity, detecting 
misconduct entails examination of stacks of content, taking different forms (text, 
pictures, videos, etc.), continuously created on various platforms, not only by the 
specific child, but also by multiple correspondents. Supervisors usually have work, 
household commitments, and leisure activities, which limit the time and energy they 
can dedicate to such examination. The cost of performing this task would be 
prohibitively high. Third, even if a supervisor could reasonably review all  
cyber-communications, the content would often be unintelligible due to the use of 
adolescent cyber-slang or group-speak, an esoteric subtext, or an unknown real-life 
background. Adult supervisors lack the expertise to readily understand children’s 
social interaction in the digital realm when revealed to them. Fourth, the 
supervisor’s ability to monitor the child’s cyber-activity may be subject to  
privacy-related constraints. Under privacy law, school employees have limited 
access to students’ cyber-communications. Parents, who do have access, may be 
justifiably hesitant to invade children’s privacy. Psychologists advocate authoritative 
parenting, which “involves active engagement with the teenager’s life but not 
excessive monitoring, which [can either] generate intense opposition or inhibit 
development of the [teen’s] ability to make autonomous choices.”327 Fifth, 
adolescents can conceal some of their cyber-activity, for example, by deleting 
conversations or application logs, using password protected websites, or operating 
fake profiles. Finally, the burden of obtaining information may be exacerbated when 
the supervisor is simultaneously responsible for more than one person. Parents may 
have more than one child, and schools have hundreds of students. In conclusion, 
monitoring is very costly in the absence of a concrete substantiated complaint about 
a specific child’s misbehavior. 
High information costs may have undesirable outcomes. If supervisors cannot 
practically become aware of the child’s wrongdoing, they will not know when they 
need to react. Imposing liability will not incentivize them to take any measures to 
prevent or stop the wrongdoing. In such a case, a claim against the supervisor will 
have a high administrative cost with no benefit in terms of harm prevention. If 
obtaining information is possible, but its cost exceeds the supervisor’s expected 
liability, the supervisor will choose not to obtain the necessary information, without 
which he or she cannot and will not respond to the child’s (unknown) wrongdoing. 
Again, liability will have a high administrative cost and no benefit in terms of harm 
prevention. If information costs plus the costs of harm prevention measures are 
lower than expected liability, imposing liability will induce economically justified 
action by the supervisor. Yet it might not be efficient overall if the net social benefit 
 
327. Scott et al., supra note 285, at 38–39. 
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of the supervisor’s prevention efforts, namely expected harm minus the cost of the 
measures taken, including the high information cost, is lower than the administrative 
cost of the claim. 
3. Anonymity 
Courts cannot impose liability on an unidentified party, and if the juvenile 
cyber-wrongdoer is anonymous, his or her real-life supervisors will also be 
unknown. The high cost of identifying an anonymous wrongdoer is a problem that 
imposing liability on a real-life supervisor cannot solve, because the cost of 
identifying the supervisor may be just as high. Admittedly, imposing liability on a 
supervisor entails identification of the supervisor, not the specific wrongdoer. An 
identified supervisor can be found liable for allowing cyber-wrongdoing by an 
unidentified child using the supervisor’s equipment, such as a school computer or 
router. Still, the wrongdoer’s anonymity will normally mask the supervisor’s identity, 
so imposing liability on either will require a costly unmasking process. To bring an 
action against an anonymous wrongdoer’s supervisor, the victim must obtain the 
wrongdoer’s IP address from the platform operator and then obtain the 
wrongdoer’s or the supervisor’s identity from the ISP.328 This is a costly process. 
Most tactics used by the tortfeasor to conceal his or her identity, apart from using 
the supervisor’s multiuser computer or router to anonymously connect to the 
Internet, will further hinder the supervisor’s identification.329 Service providers’ data 
retention limits are another hurdle.330 
If supervisors have reason to believe that their identification is technically 
impossible, they will not be incentivized to take cost-effective measures to prevent 
cyber-wrongdoing. If identification is possible, but its costs are very high, victims 
might be deterred from bringing or continuing valid lawsuits, and supervisors will 
not internalize the harm.331 If the victim can easily establish the wrongdoer’s 
identity, the wrongdoer or the supervisor will internalize the costs of the 
wrongdoing, and efficient deterrence will be achieved; but the administrative costs 
might outweigh the benefits in terms of cost-reducing deterrence, making the entire 
process inefficient. Finally, even if identification costs are lower than the benefits 
in terms of deterrence, their magnitude might render another party (for example, a 
virtual supervisor) a more cost-effective target for enforcement efforts. 
 
328. See supra Section II.A.4. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. 
331. The impact is related to supervisors’ perception of the likelihood that supervised children 
mask their identities when harming others. 
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C. Virtual Supervisors 
1. The Economic Justification for Liability 
Imposing liability on juvenile cyber-wrongdoers might not provide efficient 
deterrence at a reasonable administrative cost. Minors’ inability to compensate their 
victims, grasp the wrongfulness of their conduct, and rationally respond to the 
prospect of liability, and the high cost of identifying anonymous wrongdoers, 
prevent internalization of the social costs of wrongdoing or make efficient 
deterrence wasteful due to the administrative cost. Imposing liability on real-life 
supervisors can help control juvenile misconduct but might involve high 
information costs and is also hampered by anonymity. Under these circumstances, 
virtual supervisors’ liability should be considered. 
Imposing liability on virtual supervisors can incentivize them to take the 
necessary precautions to prevent cyber-wrongdoing. The benefits are clear. First, 
virtual supervisors are less likely to be judgment-proof or lack the cognitive, 
emotional, and social skills to understand the potential impact of the conduct and 
its legal consequences. Second, when the wrongdoer and the real life-supervisor are 
anonymous, the administrative cost of litigating a case against them might be 
significantly higher than that of pursuing an action against a virtual supervisor. 
Third, parties who are jointly liable for a particular harm have an interest in reducing 
their own shares of the burden. Because any difficulty in identifying and suing the 
wrongdoer or the real-life supervisor will result in greater expected liability for the 
virtual supervisor, the latter has an incentive to facilitate the identification of 
anonymous wrongdoers and their real-life supervisors. To do so, virtual supervisors 
may take various measures, such as preventing contributions by unidentified users, 
collecting and retaining user information, and volunteering this information in the 
case of a lawsuit (subject to applicable law).332 
2. Inefficiencies of Liability 
Imposing liability on virtual supervisors has its weaknesses. First and 
foremost, the cost of precautions available to platform operators may be high. The 
strictest supervision model is specific monitoring. Human monitoring of  
user-generated content entails hiring and training staff to review such content and 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful content. The cost per item is not trivial, 
and it is incurred with respect to all user-generated content—as opposed to the 
administrative cost of an action against the wrongdoer or a real-life supervisor 
(including identification costs, where applicable), which is incurred only in the rare 
case of a legal complaint about a specific wrongful contribution. “Automated 
monitoring requires the development and implementation of technologies that 
 
332. Virtual supervisors might not be very keen to drag their users into court because this may 
harm their business. But the ability to share the burden will surely result in some increase in the 
likelihood of data collection. 
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preclude [wrongful contributions] while allowing legitimate speech. Once the 
mechanism has been developed, it can be implemented at a very low marginal 
cost.”333 However, the costs of continued development of the necessary tools 
cannot be ignored. Moreover, “automated systems are still expected to make more 
judgment mistakes than trained humans, and human correction mechanisms [may 
be] costly.”334 
An alternative supervision model is the “notice-and-takedown” procedure, 
whereby platform operators remove user-generated content when notified that this 
content is suspected of being wrongful.335 They can either allow the publisher of 
removed content to contest the removal, and individually investigate  
wrongful-removal complaints, or automatically restore the content upon the 
publisher’s assumption of full legal responsibility for the publication. The main 
advantage of this method is that it significantly reduces monitoring costs. But an 
automatic notice-and-takedown system enables anyone with the desire to silence 
another’s speech to do so easily and to engage in mass censorship,336 whereas 
integrating human discretion would turn it into a costly selective-monitoring system.337 
If supervision costs exceed its benefits in terms of preventing harmful 
conduct, virtual supervisors’ liability will not incentivize supervisors to take 
measures to prevent wrongful user conduct. Under a negligence-based rule, 
supervisors will not be liable at all for failing to take the supervisory measures; and 
under a strict-liability regime, they will prefer bearing liability to taking such 
measures. Either way, virtual supervisors’ liability will not prevent  
cyber-wrongdoing. Even if harm-prevention benefits exceed supervision costs, the 
net benefit may be too low to justify the administrative cost of a liability rule. Virtual 
supervisors might also try to save on monitoring costs without being exposed to 
liability through extreme and socially undesirable measures—from an immoderate 
takedown policy to prevention of user contribution. These steps would inhibit 
information flow, progress, and innovation. 
Second, most user-generated content is legitimate and socially beneficial. 
Users “create positive externalities enjoyed by advertisers, information providers, 
merchants, friends, and acquaintances.”338 Yet intermediary liability makes platform 
operators internalize the expected harms caused by relatively rare wrongful  
 
333. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 168. 
334. Id. 
335. See supra notes 268–70 and accompanying text. 
336. Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Zeran 
v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583, 606 (2008). By 
analogy, “empirical evidence indicates that more than a quarter of [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] 
takedown notices are either on shaky legal grounds or address cases in which no copyrights are 
violated.” Id. at 605. 
337. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 169. 
338. Lichtman & Posner, supra note 126, at 225. 
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user-contributions, without capturing the full social benefits of their activities.339 
This may result in over-deterrence in the form of excessive monitoring and 
overzealous censorship by platform operators.340 
Third, even if virtual supervisors choose the proper level of care, uncertainties 
may arise with respect to the wrongful nature of each contribution. These 
uncertainties force virtual supervisors to choose between two types of potential 
errors: (1) false negatives, namely, mistaking unlawful publication for lawful; and 
(2) false positives, namely, mistaking lawful publications for unlawful.341 A false 
negative carries the risks of litigation and liability, whereas a false positive does not. 
Acting on a false positive does not seem to have a real cost at all, as removal is 
almost costless. This imbalance induces virtual supervisors to remove suspicious yet 
lawful speech: to avoid liability, companies would rather err on the side of caution, 
and silence speech.342 “In addition, they may be induced to block provocative users, 
disable user contributions, or reduce demand for Web 2.0 technologies, thus 
impeding progress and innovation.”343 
Note further that concurrent liability of the wrongdoer, a real-life supervisor, 
and a virtual supervisor, as European Union law currently permits, has two 
additional disadvantages. First, to the extent that several parties are at risk of being 
liable and that each has a somewhat different perception of what constitutes 
wrongdoing, imposing liability on all may restrict freedom of speech more than 
singling out one defendant.344 Second, a combination of wrongdoers’, real-life 
supervisors’, and virtual supervisors’ liability may result in an aggregation of the 
implementation costs of all. Virtual supervisors will be led to monitoring  
user-generated content at a high cost that could be saved under an exclusive  
real-life supervisors’ liability regime. At the same time, lawsuits will still be brought 
against anonymous wrongdoers and real-life supervisors at high administrative costs 
that could be saved under an effective virtual supervisors’ liability regime. 
 
339. Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 917–18, 
921 (2002). 
340. Id. at 917–18. See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow 
Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 n.30 (2003) (“ISPs do not fully share the 
benefits its subscribers derive from placing material . . . on the network. As a result, imposing liability 
on ISPs for subscribers’ infringing material induces ISPs to overdeter, purging any material that a 
copyright holder claims is infringing.”). 
341. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 169. 
342. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Because service 
providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not for its removal, 
they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents 
were defamatory or not . . . . Thus, [indirect liability] . . . has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet 
speech.”). 
343. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 170. 
344. The set of statements considered defamatory by either party is the union of the set of 
statements considered defamatory by the speaker and the set of statements considered so by the virtual 
supervisor, which is equivalent to or larger than each set individually. 
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3. Information Without Power
An additional set of problems with virtual supervisors’ liability is a mirror 
image of one of the apparent problems with real-life supervisors’ liability. Real-life 
supervisors have the skills and ability to affect the child’s conduct but lack the 
information necessary for exercising such control. In contrast, virtual supervisors 
may have very easy access to the harmful content, which is necessary for preventing 
juvenile wrongdoing, but lack the skills and ability to affect the juvenile’s conduct. 
Regarding skills, although platforms can use algorithms to identify potentially 
harmful statements—the costs of deciding whether these statements are actually 
wrongful may be much higher for them than they are for real-life supervisors. The 
puerile and often naive nature of juvenile communications, the intricacies and 
nuances of specific social interactions and their real-life background, the inability to 
discuss content with the child, and the extent of content going through the platform 
make virtual supervision inaccurate, with a systematic bias in favor of false positive 
findings of wrongfulness. Imposing liability, either under a full-monitoring theory 
or a notice-and-takedown model, may result in a severe chilling effect. 
As regards ability, three concerns arise. First, each platform has access to 
contributions made on its own service. It is incapable of monitoring the user’s 
activity on other platforms and in real life or evaluating the cumulative effect of the 
user’s contributions and actions on the victim. Second, each platform can respond 
to wrongdoing only by restricting the use of its own service. It can prevent, through 
screening algorithms, certain kinds of expression, remove tortious material (based 
on monitoring or notification), warn users, and even suspend or terminate 
recidivists’ accounts, but they cannot do much more than that. Virtual supervisors, 
as opposed to real-life supervisors, have no control over the wrongdoer’s actions in 
other venues. For example, a social networking platform can remove harmful 
content but has nothing to do against recirculation of the same content through  
e-mail. Third, a virtual supervisor cannot educate or discipline children and 
adolescents, thereby reducing the risk of cyber-harassment in general and the risk 
of continued harassment of the specific victim in particular. 
D. A Proposed Model for Juvenile Cyber-Wrongdoing 
1. Primary Liability Not Useful but Not Barred 
The preceding analysis has shown that imposing liability on a juvenile 
wrongdoer does not provide the required incentives for harm prevention, because 
of minors’ inability to compensate victims, their limited cognitive, emotional, and 
social capacity, and the frequent use of anonymity. Children and adolescents can be 
incentivized to act properly, but not through civil liability. Supervising and 
responding to their conduct is clearly a more effective method for preventing harm. 
Supervisors’ liability (direct negligence-based or strict-vicarious) can incentivize 
supervisors to take cost-effective measures, and one needs to determine which 
supervisor is best equipped to bear this burden. 
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Although primary wrongdoers’ liability is economically insufficient, it should 
not be barred. First, if the perpetrator is incapable of compensating, comprehending 
the wrongfulness of the conduct, or rationally responding to the risks, the victim 
will not have an incentive to bring an action anyway. With no prospect of recovery, 
either because the defendant is judgment-proof or because of the difficulties in 
establishing fault, initiating litigation seems pointless. The ability to pursue a claim 
against the primary wrongdoer should be maintained for the rare cases in which 
suing is economically reasonable. Inviting courts to decide on a case-by-case basis 
if pursuing the claim is economically reasonable would involve high administrative 
costs and not provide much greater accuracy than simply relying on victims’ 
common sense. Second, in some jurisdictions and circumstances, bringing an action 
against the juvenile wrongdoer along with a claim against the supervisor may enable 
or reduce the costs of administering the latter. For example, if parents’ liability is 
vicarious, an action against the child (in addition to a lawsuit against the parents) 
may help establish the wrong for which vicarious liability can be imposed. Similarly, 
if the wrongdoer is anonymous, imposing liability on the real-life supervisor would 
often entail identification of the primary wrongdoer, and this will depend on the 
existence of a prima facie cause of action against him or her.345 
2. Reducing Information Costs: Basic Models 
The cornerstone of the proposed models is a comparison between real-life 
and virtual supervisors. While real-life supervisors’ liability can generate the required 
incentives to prevent harmful conduct, it raises several questions and concerns. To 
begin with, liability must be imposed on the least cost avoider. In the information 
age, the choice no longer hinges on time and space. Thus, for example, parents who 
buy mobile phones for their children may be better equipped to supervise and 
respond to the children’s cyber-activity even during schooltime and on school 
premises. More importantly, while real-life supervisors have the ability to educate 
and discipline, and even stop concrete incidents of cyberbullying, they do not have 
the capacity to monitor children in real time, to overcome children’s concealment 
efforts, to cope with the amounts of content produced, and to effortlessly 
understand it, and may be further limited by privacy-related constraints. In addition, 
if a child commits a wrong anonymously, it will be equally difficult to identify the 
real-life supervisor.
Imposing liability on virtual supervisors can generate incentives to prevent 
cyber-wrongdoing when primary wrongdoers’ liability fails and save identification 
costs in cases of anonymous wrongdoing. However, the cost of accurate supervision 
is very high; liability for the negative externalities of operating a platform with no 
reward for the positive externalities of such operation generates over-deterrence; 
and the asymmetry between the legal outcomes of false negative determinations of 
wrongfulness (liability) and false positives (no-liability) encourages silencing in cases 
 
345. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
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of uncertainty. Moreover, virtual supervisors may have easy access to the harmful 
content, which is necessary for preventing the child’s wrongdoing, but lack the skills 
and ability to affect the child’s conduct. They cannot easily determine whether the 
publication of a certain item is wrongful (increasing the risk of a chilling effect); they 
cannot get the full picture of the juvenile interaction, respond beyond the confines 
of the specific platform, and educate or discipline children. 
At this stage, let us make two simplifying assumptions, which will be relaxed 
in subsequent sections. First, assume that there is only one category of real-life 
supervisors, namely parents. Second, assume that the wrongdoer is readily 
identifiable. The comparison can now be restated thus: real-life supervisors may 
acquire a fuller picture of the interaction and respond in numerous ways to curtail 
cyberbullying; but they do not have the capacity to monitor children in real time, to 
cope with the amounts of content produced, and to overcome concealment efforts, 
and may be further limited by privacy-related constraints. In contrast, virtual 
supervisors have easy access to content generated through their own services but 
lack the ability to effectively prevent or curtail juvenile misconduct. Even if virtual 
supervisors had full access to users’ cyber-activity, an unlikely scenario from 
economic and privacy law perspectives, they would be unable to effectively control 
cyberbullying. If parents had quick and inexpensive access to a roughly accurate risk 
analysis of their children’s cyber-activity, they would not only be cheaper cost 
avoiders than any virtual supervisor, but also cost-effective risk avoiders. This 
outcome can be pursued in at least two ways. 
The first model is algorithmic data collection and analysis by virtual 
supervisors and automatic transfers of information about suspected wrongdoing to 
users’ parents. Two questions arise at this point: Is this model feasible, and how can 
liability rules secure the proper incentives? As regards feasibility, the answer lies in 
the technological realm. Each operator of a platform that might be used by children 
and adolescents for cyber-wrongdoing can enable designated adults (usually users’ 
parents) to receive notifications about suspected abuse. This may require 
registration, possibly password protected, from within each application used by a 
child. Once the parent registers, he or she can be notified about any algorithmically 
identified suspicion at a negligible cost. Platform operators would only need to 
implement reasonable screening algorithms, as many already do, and leave any 
decision regarding the wrongfulness of the conduct and the proper response to 
parents, reducing the risk of an industry chilling effect. Presumably, with time, 
operating systems installed on devices used by children will further facilitate the 
transfer of information by enabling parents to provide their contact information 
once, to be shared with all or specifically selected applications. 
As regards liability rules, the law first needs to incentivize virtual supervisors 
to create a notification system, to collect and analyze relevant information, and to 
send notifications when appropriate. A platform operator should thus be held liable 
if it does not establish a notification system, does not apply a reasonable monitoring 
algorithm, or does not alert the designated adult when the algorithm identifies a 
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suspicion. The law also needs to incentivize the parent to verify that all applications 
used by the child on a smartphone, a tablet, a laptop, or a desktop designate the 
parent as the person to be notified in case of abuse. A parent should be held liable 
for cyber-wrongdoing by his or her child when the parent did not opt-in to the 
notification service of the application used for the particular wrongdoing or failed 
to take reasonable measures to address suspected misconduct when notified. If 
parents are liable for failing to opt in, operating system developers will be 
incentivized to provide a tool for reducing the hassle and risk of parental default to 
make their product attractive for customers. The development of an operating 
system feature, enabling parents to provide their contact information only once, will 
probably occur without further legal intervention. 
The main problem with the first model is that it is platform specific. Parents 
would be unable to monitor activity on applications used only on devices beyond 
their control, such as school desktop computers. More importantly, while parents 
will be alerted about their children’s abuse of native applications, such as Facebook 
or WhatsApp, they would have no control over cyber-wrongdoing through web 
applications, such as posts and comments on blogs and online forums,346 online 
reader responses, or webmail. A related but easily soluble problem is that parents 
would be unable to supervise the child’s activity on a specific platform before 
realizing that the child is actually using it and requesting notification of abuse, 
especially if the child removes the application or closes the browser window 
immediately after the abuse. The operating system feature described above can solve 
this problem by automatically linking any new application to the parents’ contact 
information. Lastly, platform-specific models might be deficient to the extent that 
platform operators have no presence in the relevant jurisdiction. If liability is 
practically unenforceable, it has no deterrent effect. 
The second model hinges on the use of data collection and analysis tools by 
the parents to reduce their own information costs. The same two questions  
arise: Is this model feasible, and how can liability rules secure the proper incentives? 
Parental cyber-surveillance tools are already available. Parents can obtain full access 
to the child’s browser history, e-mails, social networking activity, instant messaging, 
text messaging, and the like, through special surveillance applications and services, 
such as Monqi, mSpy, Spyzie, and TeenSafe. Surveillance tools seemingly suffer 
from two major weaknesses. First, although they provide access to information, 
parents still need to review a large quantity of content, taking different forms, 
continuously created on various platforms, not only by the specific child but also 
by his or her peers. Parents do not have the time and energy to carry out this task. 
Second, many parents would not want to so blatantly invade their child’s privacy 
and so strictly limit his or her autonomy. Presumably, these two problems can be 
solved with algorithmic data collection and analysis. Instead of perusing all content, 
 
346. As in the case of D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, rev. denied, No. S181558, 2010  
Cal. LEXIS 6052 ( June 17, 2010). 
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which is both impractical and disrespectful of the child’s privacy, parents would 
seek to rely on algorithmic tools, which would analyze all data and inform them of 
dubious activity that requires additional scrutiny. Surveillance applications already 
offer keyword and illicit content alerts, and application vendors can gradually 
develop and offer more complex data analysis and notification features. Replacing 
full human monitoring with algorithmic data collection and analysis tools will reduce 
parents’ information costs and parent-child friction over infringement of privacy. 
This is also preferable to notifications following data collection and analysis by 
individual platforms, which only access fragments of the full picture. Of course, if 
parents use these tools, there is no need for direct communication between 
platforms and parents with respect to possible abuse of these platforms on 
monitored devices. 
Parents may have a sufficiently strong incentive to use advanced surveillance 
applications to protect their own children. Many parents already do, and this is 
encouraged by experts in various disciplines.347 In theory, legal incentives to acquire 
and employ these tools may be redundant. However, given the cost of using these 
applications, which may include a nontrivial price tag as well as parental time and 
energy, parents’ overconfidence in their children’s virtue, and the common 
reluctance to constrain privacy, internalization of the expected costs to others of 
the child’s activity may be necessary. To incentivize parents to reasonably use 
advanced surveillance applications, the law should impose liability when failure to 
employ such tools results in juvenile cyber-wrongdoing, in addition to standard 
liability for not taking reasonable precautions upon learning about the risk. The 
remaining question is what would incentivize vendors to develop and offer 
advanced data collection and analysis features. If parents could be held liable for 
failing to efficiently monitor their children’s cyber-activity, they would be willing to 
pay a certain premium for features that ease detection of cyber-wrongdoing, thereby 
reducing the cost of monitoring and the risk of liability. Parents’ willingness to pay 
will create incentives for competing application vendors. 
The main problem with the second model is that it is device specific. While 
parents will obtain information about their children’s abuse of a specific device 
under surveillance, they will have no control over cyber-activity on other devices, 
such as school or library computers. The likelihood of ongoing abuse through 
devices that the parents cannot access is not very high, but this possibility should 
not be ignored. The next Section will address this concern. Furthermore, using 
 
347. See, e.g., Meltem Dinleyci et al., Media Use by Children, and Parents’ Views on Children’s 
Media Usage, 5 INTERACTIVE J. MED. RES. e18 (2016) (“Encouraging parents to monitor children’s 
media carefully can have a wide range of health benefits for children.”); Douglas A. Gentile et al., 
Protective Effects of Parental Monitoring of Children’s Media Use: A Prospective Study, 168 JAMA 
PEDIATRICS 479, 480 (2014) (“Many negative effects of both the amount and content of media may be 
mitigated by parental monitoring of children’s media use.”); Dick Uliano, Police: Parents Need to Monitor 
Kids’ Cellphone Use, WTOP (Nov. 21, 2017, 8:09 PM), https://wtop.com/ 
local/2017/11/police-parents-need-monitor-kids-cellphone-use/ [https://perma.cc/X6UU-LK99]. 
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advanced surveillance applications currently involves a real outlay for the parents 
(in the form of monthly service fees), as opposed to the first model which has no 
direct monetary cost for them. Holding parents negligent for failing to take the more 
costly measure may not be defensible given its limited and speculative marginal 
benefit: the added ability to oversee the use of web applications on  
parent-controlled devices minus the lost ability to oversee the use of supervised 
applications on third-party devices.348 
 
 Device under 
parents’ control 
Device not under 
parents’ control 
Apps under parents’ control Model 1, Model 2 Model 1 
Apps not under parents’ control Model 2 Neither
 
Table 1. Coverage by Proposed Models 
3. Relaxing the First Assumption 
The previous Section made two simplifying assumptions: (1) there is only one 
category of real-life supervisors, and (2) the wrongdoer is readily identifiable. These 
assumptions will now be relaxed in turn. The first inquiry, then, is how the 
preceding analysis must change if there is more than one category of real-life 
supervisors, for example, parents and school personnel. The first model proposed 
for reducing the cost of monitoring children’s cyber-activity is platform specific. It 
will keep parents informed about their children’s activity on some applications 
regardless of time and space constraints. The parent will receive notifications of 
abuse through various platforms, even if the child accesses these platforms on 
devices beyond the parent’s reach. However, parents will not obtain information 
about cyber-wrongdoing through unsupervised communication methods, such as 
webmail, or any communication method used solely on devices beyond their reach. 
If this model is adopted, the legal system must incentivize those who can acquire 
such information to do so and respond reasonably. 
Regardless of the specific technological tool used to reduce data collection and 
analysis costs, any institution allowing many children to access cyberspace through 
its electronic equipment must require individual identification. In the case of  
cyber-wrongdoing, the source of the content will be detectable. If the institution 
fails to enforce individual identification, it must be held liable for any  
cyber-wrongdoing perpetrated by unidentified users through its equipment. 
Now, reducing information costs concerning cyber-activity beyond the 
parents’ control may take several forms. To begin with, a school representative can 
serve as the designated adult for receiving notifications about students’ abuse of 
 
348. From an aggregate welfare perspective, developing platform-specific data collection and 
analysis tools may be more costly than developing advanced parental surveillance tools. Nevertheless, 
platform operators may ultimately use less costly off-the-shelf software and services based on the same 
technologies used by parental surveillance applications. 
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applications on school computers, unless parents have already assumed this role for 
the specific applications. Upon notification, the school can endeavor to stop the 
wrongdoing, inter alia, by informing the wrongdoer’s parents. In addition to 
incentivizing virtual supervisors to establish algorithmic data analysis and 
notification systems, as explained above,349 the law will need to incentivize schools 
to obtain the necessary information from platforms used on school devices. They 
should be held liable for cyber-wrongdoing by students if they did not opt in to the 
notification service of the abused application (unless the parents are already the 
designated adults) or failed to take reasonable measures to address suspected 
wrongdoing when notified. This combination of platform-specific data analysis and 
notification systems will cover any abuse of native applications. Nonetheless, it has 
two weaknesses. First, it keeps all activity through web applications covert. Second, 
granting schools access to students’ cyber-activity outside of school is  
legally problematic.350
Alternatively, owners or operators of devices accessible by children can be 
incentivized to employ user-specific surveillance tools, such as Securly, by holding 
them liable for any cyber-wrongdoing resulting from failing to do so. They should 
also be liable if the surveillance application notified them of possible wrongdoing, 
and they failed to take reasonable measures to prevent harm.351 Informing the 
parents, who may have a fuller knowledge and understanding of the situation, and 
obtaining their feedback, is a necessary step in devising the proper response. While 
schools may be constrained in searching students’ personal devices, there does not 
seem to be a substantive legal obstacle to monitoring school devices.352 The 
problems with this model are that it does not cover abuse of web applications on 
parent-controlled devices and involves wasteful double scrutiny of cyber-activity on 
school devices through parentally-monitored applications. 
The second model proposed for reducing the cost of parental monitoring of 
children’s cyber-activity is device specific. Parents using surveillance applications 
gain access to the child’s cyber-activity only through devices under the parents’ 
control. Parents are unable to monitor any activity on “external” devices, even if the 
child uses platforms that are also installed on devices with parental surveillance. 
Requiring owners or operators of devices accessible by children to request user 
identification and employ user-specific surveillance tools may solve the problem. If 
the surveillance application notifies the device owner of a potential misdeed, the 
owner can immediately respond. Frequently, informing the child’s parents may be 
 
349. See supra Section II.D.2. 
350. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text. 
351. Theoretically, schools can prohibit or block any use of potentially harmful applications on 
school computers. This will protect the school from liability for students’ abuse of its equipment, but 
cannot be legally required. It is unjustified economically and pedagogically but within  
school prerogative. 
352. See Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School 
Surveillance Authority Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 63, 70–87, 119 (2014) 
(discussing the different levels of school surveillance authority). 
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a reasonable response. The parents, after receiving all relevant information, are 
expected to take reasonable measures to prevent harm. This combination of device-
specific data collection and analysis tools is the most comprehensive method for 
reducing information costs, as it covers all applications on all devices. Channeling 
all information to the parents enables the least cost avoiders to assess the risks and 
take cost-effective measures to reduce them. 
 
 Device under 
parents’ control 
Device not under 
parents’ control 
Apps under parents’ control Model 1, Model 2 Model 1, School 
monitoring 
Apps not under parents’ control Model 2 School monitoring
 
Table 2. Coverage with More Than One Supervisor 
4. Relaxing the Second Assumption 
An additional complication arises in the case of anonymous  
cyber-wrongdoing. Courts cannot impose liability on an unidentified party, and if 
the juvenile cyber-wrongdoer is anonymous, his or her real-life supervisors will 
usually be unknown. One option is to foreclose virtual supervisors’ liability but 
enable courts to order cyber service providers to disclose information about 
anonymous wrongdoers and their real-life supervisors (the American model).353 Yet 
the costs of identifying an anonymous wrongdoer might be prohibitively high, and 
imposing liability on real-life supervisors would not normally reduce these costs.354 
A second option is to impose strict or negligence-based liability on virtual 
supervisors for abuse of their platforms while preventing identification of 
anonymous users (the Israeli model).355 This saves identification costs when the 
wrongdoer is anonymous but entails high monitoring and error costs as discussed 
above.356 A third option is to simultaneously enable identification of anonymous 
wrongdoers and recognize virtual supervisors’ liability (the European model).357 
However, to the extent that two or more parties may be liable and that each has a 
different perception of what constitutes wrongdoing, imposing liability on all may 
restrict freedom of speech more than singling out one defendant.358 Moreover, 
concurrent liability of real-life and virtual supervisors may result in an aggregation 
of the implementation costs of the two regimes. Virtual supervisors will be led to 
monitor user-generated content at a high cost that could be saved under an exclusive 
real-life supervisors’ liability regime. At the same time, lawsuits will be brought 
 
353. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 163–65, 175. 
354. See supra Sections II.A.4, II.B.3. 
355. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 167–68, 175. 
356. See supra Section II.C.2. 
357. Perry & Zarsky, supra note 317, at 170–71, 175. 
358. See supra note 346. 
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against anonymous wrongdoers and real-life supervisors at high administrative costs 
that could be saved under an effective virtual supervisors’ liability regime. 
The fourth option is the most efficient adjustment to the basic liability  
model: it minimizes identification costs and facilitates parental liability while saving 
virtual supervisors’ monitoring and error costs. This adjustment is based on the 
English defamation model, whereby the cyber-wrongdoer is exclusively liable, but 
if he or she is not reasonably reachable, the platform operator may become liable. 
The virtual supervisor is liable if the victim has insufficient information to identify 
the wrongdoer, the victim gave notice of the complaint, and the virtual supervisor 
did not properly respond.359 A proper response requires obtaining the wrongdoer’s 
contact information and providing it to the victim or removing the wrongful 
content.360 Under this “residual liability” regime, virtual supervisors can avoid 
liability and monitoring altogether by (1) obtaining user identification data, at least 
when a content analysis algorithm identifies suspected cyber-wrongdoing, or 
(2) removing content generated by unreachable users on notification of its harmful 
potential. This will save all monitoring costs and prevent over-deterrence caused by 
non-internalization of the economic benefits of Web 2.0 technologies and by the 
asymmetric legal response to judgment errors. Additionally, by incentivizing virtual 
supervisors to take measures to reduce the cost of identifying anonymous 
wrongdoers, this method will facilitate parental liability which induces efficient 
parental supervision. Theoretically, if virtual supervisors under a residual liability 
regime allow postings by unreachable wrongdoers, they might still need to monitor 
to avoid liability. Even so, monitoring will be limited to content generated by 
unidentifiable users, so the cost will be much lower than in the case of liability for 
any abuse. Presumably, virtual supervisors will allow anonymous contributions only 
if the benefit (for instance, increasing traffic) exceeds the costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Cyberbullying has become a notorious epidemic, culminating in widely 
publicized suicides.361 Whether a new and distinct problem or an old one in a new 
guise,362 the technological setting has undoubtedly generated new challenges and, at 
the same time, new opportunities for legal response. This Article provides 
systematic legal and economic analyses of an underexplored regulatory tool: civil 
liability. The analysis on both levels is based on a trichotomy of potential 
defendants—primary wrongdoers, real-life supervisors, and virtual supervisors. 
Part I discussed applicable law with a comparative touch. Section A examined 
common law causes of action that can be used in lawsuits against primary 
 
359. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 5(3)–(4) (U.K.). 
360. Id. § 5(3)(c), (5). 
361. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
362. See Dieter Wolke et al., Cyberbullying: A Storm in a Teacup?, 26 EUR. CHILD  
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 899 (2017) (finding that cyberbullying neither increases the number of 
bullying victims significantly nor exacerbates the psychological and psychosocial impact of bullying). 
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wrongdoers, including an independent tort of cyberbullying, defamation, invasion 
of privacy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the prima 
facie tort. It pinpointed possible difficulties in establishing these causes of action 
and, more generally, in pursuing claims against tech-savvy minors 
—age-related legal constraints, anonymity, and low expected recovery. Section B 
turned to the two main categories of real-life supervisors: parents and schools. It 
examined several theories of parental liability, including negligent entrustment of a 
dangerous instrument, negligent supervision, and negligent enabling of a tort, and 
identified their particular limits along with the general difficulty associated with 
anonymous misconduct. Section B then analyzed common law and statutory bases 
of school and school personnel liability, including negligent supervision, § 1983, and 
Title VI, and explained that such liability is subject to constitutional and legal 
constraints on school regulation of student speech and off-campus activity. Section 
C showed that under American law, virtual supervisors are immune from liability 
for wrongful user-contributions. It presented the European Union framework and 
the English model, as well as local calls for reform. 
Part II evaluated the different regimes from an economic perspective and laid 
the foundations for a technology-powered model. Section A explained that primary 
wrongdoers’ liability cannot achieve efficient deterrence because of minors’ inability 
to compensate victims, limited cognitive, emotional, and social capacity, and 
frequent use of anonymity. Section B discussed real-life supervisors, focusing on 
the gap between their considerable power to affect supervised children’s conduct 
and the high cost of information necessary for exercising that power. Section C 
showed that virtual supervisors’ liability may be inefficient due to the high cost of 
monitoring, non-internalization of the economic benefits of the participatory web 
by service providers, and an asymmetry between false negative and false positive 
determinations of wrongfulness. Additionally, it argued that virtual supervisors can 
easily access relevant information but lack the power to affect juvenile conduct. 
Lastly, Section D constructed an efficiency-oriented model which integrates 
technological tools to reduce information costs. First, primary tortfeasors’ liability 
is economically insufficient, but should not be barred. Second, to incentivize 
parents to reasonably use advanced surveillance applications, the law should impose 
liability when failure to employ such tools results in juvenile  
cyber-wrongdoing, in addition to standard liability for not taking reasonable 
precautions upon learning about the risk. Third, schools should be liable for 
cyberbullying through school devices if they failed to (1) enforce reliable 
identification of users, (2) employ advanced surveillance tools, or (3) take 
reasonable measures to prevent harm upon notification of possible misconduct. 
Fourth, a virtual supervisor is liable if the victim has insufficient information to 
identify the wrongdoer, the victim gave notice of the complaint, and the virtual 
supervisor did not properly respond. 
Reports on the high prevalence of cyberbullying, together with rare but salient 
deaths, have led legislators, policymakers, and academics to an understandable 
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pursuit of appropriate solutions. Regrettably, while delegation of power to 
educational institutions and criminalization of cyber-misconduct are relatively 
common, at least in public discourse, the potential impact of civil liability has been 
downplayed. This Article has put it under the spotlight, without contesting the 
possible need for a more comprehensive framework. 
